FEASIBILITY STUDY

FOR IMPROVED GLOBAL MONITORING
OF ATTACKS ON EDUCATION

October 2011
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Education Above All
Child Protection in Crisis

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GMS Feasibility Study: Definitions and Typology
PREFACE
This report was commissioned as a response to growing international concern over attacks on education globally, including killings, injury and abductions of students and staff, and destruction of infrastructure. The study represented a first investigation into the feasibility of collecting more comprehensive data on such attacks, including incidence, prevalence, motives and responses.

The report is the output of a partnership between the University of Columbia Group on Children and Adversity, led by Professor Neil Boothby, and Education Above All (EAA), a Qatar-based independent NGO. The Columbia research team comprised faculty and research associates Neil Boothby, Alastair Ager, Brian Root and Jessica Alexander. Research on higher education was undertaken by Robert Quinn, Executive Director of the Scholars at Risk Network at New York University, and research assistants Utuakwa Allen, Amy Kapit-Spitalny and Liz Knauer.

The study took place between December 2010 and June 2011. The study was guided by a reference group comprising Desmond Bermingham (Save the Children), Rosalie Azar (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict), Bede Sheppard (Human Rights Watch), Stephane Pichette and Lara Scott (UNICEF), Dana Burde (New York University), and Brendan O’Malley (media specialist/international education). A mid-project consultation was held in May 2011 with a range of key stakeholders (see Annex 1). The three reports prepared by the project were integrated into a synthesis report by EAA, in consultation with the research team.

The report is divided into two sections:
- Part One: Overview and summary
- Part Two: Issues, methodology and trends
- Part Three: Feasible approaches to a global monitoring system
Introductions

Education Above All (EAA), a Qatar-based international NGO, was established in response to attacks on educators, students and education facilities and other disruptions of education taking place in countries affected by armed conflict. EAA works to strengthen the protection of education in times of conflict and insecurity. This requires improved monitoring and reporting of attacks on education, greater legal accountability and enhanced field-based protection and response. Following the recommendations of an international seminar bringing together legal, protection and education in emergencies specialists, EAA commissioned a feasibility study into ways of strengthening monitoring and reporting of attacks. The findings of this study will be discussed with the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) and other concerned actors.

The Child Protection in Crisis Network was established in 2008 as a mechanism to strengthen and systematize child care and protection in crisis-settings through collaborative action of humanitarian agencies, local institutions and academic partners. Emphasizing learning, the CPC Network undertakes innovative research and builds evidence to affect change in child protection policy and practice. The CPC Network now includes 78 agencies working on child protection initiatives in 31 countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Formal knowledge transfer and policy change mechanisms have also been established in five countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Liberia and Jordan (regional initiative). The secretariat of the CPC Network is housed at Columbia University’s Program on Forced Migration and Health—a recognized leader in the development of innovative methodologies to measure and respond to child rights violations in crisis affected countries.
1. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY

1.1 Background
Recent years have seen growing evidence of attacks on education during times of armed conflict and insecurity. The first global report on this problem, *Education under Attack*, was published by UNESCO in 2007 (O’Malley, 2007). In partnership with Education Above All (EAA), UNESCO commissioned an update of this study, *Education under Attack 2010* (O’Malley, 2010), and convened an international expert seminar, held in Paris in September 2009. This seminar brought together 75 experts in the fields of humanitarian and human rights law, and child protection, as well as education in emergencies. This group recommended continued interdisciplinary cooperation on protecting education from attack (UNESCO, 2010: 6). At a follow-up meeting in New York in February 2010, key stakeholders implemented this recommendation through the establishment of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA).

Recommendations from the Paris seminar of relevance to the present paper included:

- “Contributing to efforts to establish a system of global surveillance of the full range of attacks on education, which would comprise several information components, including incidence, prevalence, coverage and evaluation, and use baselines and globally-established indicators in capturing and analyzing data.”
- *Deepening knowledge of the nature, scope and motives of attacks; the long-term impact of such attacks on individuals, communities, education systems, and the right to good quality education for all; and the relationship between attacks on education and development, conflict and fragility.*” (UNESCO, 2010:5)

Following these recommendations, Education Above All (EAA) commissioned a feasibility study on ways of improving global monitoring and reporting of attacks on education and associated responses. A partnership was established for this purpose with the University of Columbia Group on Children in Adversity, led by Professor Neil Boothby. Detailed reports were prepared for purposes of internal discussion, leading to the present overview of the issues for consideration by concerned stakeholders.

1.2 Research process and stakeholder participation
The research took place from December 2010 to May 2011 and was divided into three phases:

- Phase 1: Definitions and typology
- Phase 2: Analysis of current status of monitoring attacks on education
- Phase 3: Analysis of various approaches to improved global monitoring and reporting.

A start-up workshop was held in December 2010 including the research team and reference group, to discuss issues of definition, typology and methodology. It was decided that Phase 2 of the research
would incorporate telephone interviews with a wide range of stakeholders. A total of 54 semi-structured interviews were conducted, mainly with staff of UN agencies, NGOs, and other actors.

A mid-term project review was held on 2-3 May 2011, to discuss the outputs of phases 1 and 2, and approaches to phase 3, analysis of the feasibility of different approaches to improved monitoring and reporting. A wide range of stakeholders was represented at this meeting (see Annex 1).

Consultation with stakeholders on the final output of the partnership (the present document) will take place through electronic means, together with face-to-face discussions as appropriate, including at the November 2011 meeting of the GCPEA Steering Committee which represents eight key stakeholders as well as a wider group of affiliated organizations.

1.3 Definition of attacks on education
The study developed the following definition as useful for the feasibility study:

any deliberate threat or use of force, including coercive or physical force, carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, religious or criminal reasons, with the intention or reasonably foreseeable effect of harming or intimidating any individual in their capacity as a member of an education community (including service personnel, and security personnel protecting infrastructure, and students and staff whether on the premises or en route) or gravely damaging or creating risk of grave damage to any educational buildings, resources, materials or facilities, including transport.

More briefly:

An attack on education comprises intentional threats or uses of physical or coercive force against the members or infrastructures of an education community.

1.4 Typology and useful indicators
Major variables that were identified for the typology to categorise attacks included:

- motives
- nature of attacks
- impacts
- responses.

Key indicators for describing the nature of the actual attacks on education may include, for each level/type of education:

- Deaths (students; education/service/protection personnel)
- Injured (students; education/service/protection personnel)
- Child soldier recruitment
- Other abductions (students/education personnel)
- Education buildings destroyed/damaged
- Military or security forces occupation/use of education buildings (part/whole)
- Persons detained/imprisoned (students/education personnel)
- Number of education facilities closed

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1 See Figure 1 in section 2 below.

GMS Feasibility Study: Definitions and Typology
• Days of forced closure of education facilities
• Recorded threats of the above

Contextual information for individual violent attacks may include:

• Type of target/victims (ethnic/religious group; gender)
• Method of attack (bomb, IED, suicide bomb, arson, shooting, other)
• Types of prior safety measures
• Other facility information (e.g. use as polling station; presence of security walls; public/private ownership)
• Perpetrator information
• Impact
• Responses

A wider range of indicators would be needed to take account of attacks in the form of job-related persecution especially of teachers and university staff, which can include unjustified imprisonment, loss of career opportunities or dismissal, etc.

1.5 Current mechanisms for monitoring attacks on education
The research team reviewed ongoing monitoring and reporting processes, including those below:

UN-led:

• Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), established under Security Council Resolution 1612. The MRM is implemented in countries named in the Annexes to the Secretary General’s reports on Children and Armed Conflict. The country-level task force reports on six violations, including “attacks on schools and hospitals” (recently named as a “trigger” for listing of countries). The focus is on reporting specific incidents that have been verified by site visits and interviews, rather than broader statistical data collection.

• Education Cluster. In its work of coordinating educational responses to humanitarian crises, the Education Cluster is a focal point where information is collated. In the past, the clusters have not systematically collected information on attacks on education, but recent deployments of an information officer in Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan have enabled collection of relevant information, notably on damage to infrastructure, and impacts such as school closures.

• Inter-governmental thematic reports. As noted earlier, UNESCO took the lead in commissioning a global study of attacks on education in 2007 and again in 2010 (O’Malley, 2007, 2010). The inter-agency Global Monitoring Report on Education for All annual reports also provide some information regarding education in conflict-affected settings, notably in the 2011 edition which focused on the impact of armed conflict (UNESCO, 2011).

INGO thematic reports: Human Rights Watch, Watchlist, CARE and other organizations have produced reports focused on or reporting on attacks on education.

Local civil society databases: An example is the collection of data by the Center for Human Rights Studies and Right to Education Campaign at Birzeit University on student
arrests and mobility, and academic freedom issues. The Partnerships for the Protection of Children in Conflict (PPCC) network in Nepal collects and collates data on child rights violations including attacks on education.

**Centralised databases:** The Network for Education and Academic Rights (NEAR) and Education International (EI) both maintain incident databases of alleged attacks on education, primarily for use in advocacy and lobbying to help threatened educators as individuals or in general. The Scholars at Risk Network (SAR), the International Institute of International Education (IIE)’s Scholar Rescue Fund (SRF), and the Council for Assisting Refugee Academics (CARA) maintain databases for evaluating and providing direct assistance to endangered scholars.

**Academic research:** An example is the recent Columbia University Program on Forced Migration and Health (CUPFMH)’s study on grave violations of children’s rights in the conflict-affected South Kivu area of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Using a population-based method, the study found that violations were twenty times more numerous than those reported through the MRM.

### 1.6 Stakeholder views on monitoring and reporting

Several broad trends were identified by the research team during the interviews with stakeholders:

**Interest in improved monitoring and reporting of attacks:** There is a growing concern about attacks on education and a concomitant interest in knowing more about the problem as the basis for prevention and response.

**But no desire to reinvent the wheel:** While there was little appetite to create a new global monitoring mechanism for attacks on education, key actors were interested in improving and enriching the coverage of monitoring and reporting through current institutional frameworks. At higher education level there is no global monitoring system at present, but respondents encouraged building on existing efforts through stronger incentives for local reporting and for coordination among global initiatives.

**Definitional challenges remain:** The MRM definitions are quite narrow but not always interpreted consistently. At higher education level, there are important concerns about implied or threatened use of force and other coercive measures to impair academic content and conduct.

**Different actors have different information needs:** The MRM needs UN-verified incident data, as do legal actors such as international tribunals. Education responders need quantitative data on losses and also information on how to prevent or protect education from attack. Communities need information about how to report and respond to attacks. Global advocates need qualitative and quantitative data. Academics need a broad range of data.

**Need to agree on standard indicators:** Global reporting will be enhanced by agreement on indicators, perhaps beginning with a limited set.

**Need buy-in for collaboration:** More active collaboration is needed but will need trust and transparency. Obstacles include confidentiality regarding individuals and regarding the operations of particular organizations, which may need individual visibility and lack resources to process data into common monitoring formats.

**Need to engage a range of actors:** Key actors would include the country-based Education Cluster, Protection Cluster, and at global level, GCPEA and the Inter-agency
Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). Local actors are critical but may need incentives to compensate for time demands of reporting and issues of security.

**Training will be required.** Training would be required for field actors, including definitions, coding, indicators, data collection methodology and ethical considerations. Training will also be required for staff engaged in data entry and processing at regional and global level.

**Ethical issues must be addressed.** Informants and their families and communities may be placed at risk, and often do not receive actual benefit. Confidentiality, consent and release of information procedures may be a barrier to inter-agency data sharing.

1.7 Proposals for enhancing information gathering, collation and use at country or regional level

At present there is a lack of systematic and comprehensive reporting and monitoring of attacks on education, at country, regional and global level. At the same time, there are various practical constraints on comprehensive reporting. Based on a consideration of the issues, the research team identified the actions below as possible ways of improving current data flows at country level.

**Placement of an information officer/monitor in education and/or protection clusters**

- Deployment of an information officer for protecting education from attacks in the education or protection cluster could enable stronger collection, collation and analysis of relevant data. The recent deployment (possibly short term) of information officers in education clusters in Cote D’Ivoire and Sudan suggests that this need has been recognized by key actors. Finance is the problem. The research team suggests a pilot deployment of information officers in clusters in one or two countries.

**Supporting country-based/region-based higher education monitors**

- Part-time or full-time regional higher education monitors would solicit and collate reports on attacks on higher education in their region or sub-region, verifying them to the extent possible. They might be staff of higher education institutions or research centres or NGOs/advocates having sufficient relevant experience. They would prepare monthly and annual reports on incidents occurring during the reporting period and updates on prior reported incidents, to be circulated via public email and online, and included in global reporting (see below).

**In-depth field investigations in selected locations**

- Field investigations into attacks may be undertaken in selected countries, supported by a suitable “hub of expertise” at global level. Such investigations may include “population-based” approaches, using survey methodologies to measure the levels of incidence of attacks and prevalence of their impacts, as well as qualitative aspects such as attributed motives for attacks and impact on students’ and teachers’ lives as well as accessibility of quality education. Preventive measures and responses can be studied and good practice identified through comparative techniques where applicable.
Building stakeholder capacity

- The Education Cluster is developing a prototype country-level workshop to enable key stakeholders to review policies for protecting education in times of conflict and insecurity, with accompanying reader-friendly guidance materials. These workshops are intended to allow cluster members and other actors to develop coordinated and creative education responses in conflict-affected settings, including improved monitoring and reporting.

Developing policies that give greater incentives for local reporting

- People in conflict settings want to see an actionable outcome of their reporting of violations, in return for the considerable risks often involved, as well as time spent. One suggestion in the study was to build “reporting thresholds” into the system that would trigger more enhanced monitoring activities. The idea of “response vectors” was also developed, for example, that if there is the killing of a teacher, a predetermined stakeholder would take a predetermined action (e.g. reporting to national authorities and/or to the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings). The idea of reparations after a prosecution and conviction for attacks on education could also be explored, but such proceedings take considerable time.

1.8 Proposals for enhancing information management at global level

The research team reviewed the needs and practicalities for improved monitoring and reporting at global level and identified the possible actions below.

Continuing the Education Under Attack series

- The UNESCO Education under Attack publication series were cited as very effective reports for advocacy purposes and as the primary global advocacy tool for protecting education from attack. This series may now be published by GCPEA.

Global consolidation of higher education information

- One or more Global Higher Education Consolidators would be needed to support, and work with the data provided by, the regional monitors. The Consolidator would be selected from established academics/institutes/NGOs. Start-up requirements would include developing monitoring materials and systems, recruitment and training of regional monitors. Annual or biennial face-to-face meetings of the monitors would be desirable.

Data sharing: indicator development and website development
There is a range of options for global data sharing, and these should be discussed by key stakeholders, having regard to their needs and operational constraints. One aspect is the consensual development of priority indicators, to facilitate data sharing and data entry.

A focused website is needed to store information on attacks in general and on specific attacks, and might include open access and restricted access sections. This would require expertise at global level and training at local level, for appropriate inputting of reports and data. Such a website should be designed only after progress on developing monitoring systems at field level. The website data-hub would be closely linked with or part of the GCPEA website.

**Exploratory database study**

Several UN organizations and NGOs as well as defence and security organizations have databases that may contain information on attacks on education. It is unclear how far this information is currently shared or might in future be shared between organizations. A proposed study would identify a set of actors willing to share information and/or link database efforts.

1.9 Institutional framework: the concept of a “Global Investigative Network”

The research team was asked to consider a range of institutional frameworks for enhanced global monitoring of attacks on education. At one extreme (maximalist) might be an “observatory” seeking active 100% reporting on attacks on education globally. At the other extreme (minimalist) might be a minimal development such as the agreement of key stakeholders to use certain common indicators in their own reporting.

Discussions with key stakeholders suggested an intermediate position, where there are significant actions to improve information flow and understanding regarding attacks on education, but constraints are acknowledged - not to impose too much extra workload on field actors nor to require and possibly unsustainable levels of yearly funding.

The research team therefore developed the concept of a dynamic “Global Investigative Network” of concerned stakeholders. This network of committed stakeholders would develop priorities for enhanced information gathering and associated research, and help organize and coordinate the increased collection, collation and analysis of quantitative and qualitative information on attacks on education. The team recommended starting with pilot activities in selected countries with progressive extension of coverage drawing on lessons learned. The current situation and possible activity patterns in years 1-3, and year 5 onwards are illustrated below.
### Current Situation

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<tr>
<th>GMS Data Collection</th>
<th>Data Use/Responses</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ad hoc/sporadic local reporters triggering monitoring</strong></td>
<td><strong>Annual Report</strong> - 2 EUA reports written, unclear whether this will continue</td>
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<td>Information Manager in clusters sometimes receives security/attack information but no systematic tracking (some exceptions)</td>
<td><strong>Informal Data Sharing</strong> between agencies</td>
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- **Higher Education NGOs** – some monitoring activity but not comprehensive, not systematic, and lacking strong links with key responders

- **Effectiveness studies** conducted (ex. CARE report) but not on a regular basis

### 1-3 Year Projection

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<tr>
<th>GMS Data Collection</th>
<th>Data Use/Responses</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Global Investigative Network (GIN)</strong> - establish buy-in, identify priorities and roles</td>
<td><strong>1 EAU style annual report</strong> carried out</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cluster-based monitor</strong> piloted in 2-4 settings to collect country level data</td>
<td><strong>Data-sharing</strong> - Website Development. Regularly updated with country/regional level monitoring data and outcomes of effectiveness studies.</td>
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<td><strong>Regional Higher Education Monitors (RHEMs)</strong> piloted with 4-6 monitors</td>
<td><strong>Pre-determine response vector activities</strong> (i.e. letter appeals, complaints, lobbying)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Higher Education Consolidators (GHECs)</strong> piloted in 1 setting</td>
<td><strong>Monthly email snapshot</strong> of conditions in all regions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1-2 Effectiveness studies</strong> to determine best practice to responding to attacks</td>
<td><strong>Fact sheets</strong> on national situations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Database assessment</strong> to identify relevant databases and explore operational linkages</td>
<td><strong>Position-advocacy papers</strong> for prevention, rehabilitation, etc</td>
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<td><strong>National, regional and global level response plans</strong></td>
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**Local reporters** trained and positioned to increase monitoring (2-4 pilot countries)
Since the concept of a Global Investigative Network overlaps considerably with that of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), there is the possibility that the latter will take responsibility for many of the functions suggested for such a Network. It will be important to discuss therefore, whether a separate network is needed, or whether the activities suggested above should be considered on their merits as possible GCPEA initiatives, possibly as a distinct GCPEA Monitoring and Research Initiative.

The GCPEA plan to have a research/editing team coordinating the production of the Education Under Attack 2013 and subsequent publications means that there will already be a specialist employed to leading enhanced data production, collation, analysis and dissemination.

Nevertheless, if there is a substantial workload developed on the lines developed in the proposals above, there will be a need for some form of additional technical leadership with competencies in research, evaluation, data management etc., whether through a post or the use of consultants.
2. APPROACH TO THE STUDY

2.1 Background.

The problem of attacks on education has garnered increased attention in recent years. These concerns were discussed at the international expert seminar bringing together 75 specialists in international human rights and humanitarian law, child protection and education in emergencies, in Paris held in September 2009, which is documented in UNESCO’s (2010) Protecting Education from Attack: a State of the Art Review. The seminar participants felt a need for concerted action in this area, and key actors met in New York in February 2010, and in Paris in March 2010, leading to the formation of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA).

Recommendations of the seminar included:

- “Contributing to efforts to establish a system of global surveillance of the full range of attacks on education, which would comprise several information components, incidence, prevalence, coverage and evaluation, and use baselines and globally-established indicators in capturing and analyzing data.
- Deepening knowledge of the nature, scope and motives of attacks; the long-term impact of such attacks on individuals, communities, education systems, and the right to good quality education for all; and the relationship between attacks on education and development, conflict and fragility.” (UNESCO, 2010:5)

Education Above All (EAA) decided to initiate a feasibility study on possible systems for improved global surveillance, in partnership with concerned specialists at Columbia University and New York University (see Annex). The present study presents the outcome of this partnership.

The feasibility study was designed to draw upon the expertise of the partner institutions in relation to child protection (Columbia University), protection of threatened academics (New York University) and education in emergencies (EAA). Professor Neil Boothby led the New York-based research project, which entailed stakeholder analysis and key informant interviews. The project was designed to take place in stages, as below:

- Meeting of the research team and the project reference group (December 2010)
- Elaboration of definitions and typology
- Stakeholder analysis

PART TWO: ISSUES, METHODOLOGY AND TRENDS

- Stakeholder interviews
- Mid-project workshop with key stakeholders (May 2011)
- Feasibility analysis of possible components and architectures for improved global surveillance.

2.2 Methodology of stakeholder interviews.
The key informant interviews were semi-structured telephone conversations with key actors and experts on their monitoring of and/or responses to attacks on education. Information from these subjects helped the research team to assess the effectiveness of its typology in encompassing all types of attacks; to define what constitute “appropriate responses” to specific types of attacks on education; and to identify current sources of information on attacks, major gaps in current monitoring efforts, and data that would be required to inform and trigger more robust responses in the future.

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<th>Table 1: Key Informants Interviewed by Constituency</th>
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<td>UN/Intergovernmental</td>
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<td>Union</td>
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<td>Governmental Agency</td>
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<td>Research/Public Policy</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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The research team used purposive, non-probability sampling to systematically identify key actors and experts who together held a rich body of knowledge on the subject. The Feasibility Study Reference Group identified an initial group of key informants and thereafter snowball sampling was employed to identify additional interview subjects. The research team interviewed 54 key actors and experts, including representatives of 38 organizations. Interview subjects included intergovernmental agency staff, academics and other education actors, humanitarian actors, human rights advocates and local civil society actors. In addition to these sampling methods, the researchers examined lists of participants from the major conferences on attacks on education to identify additional informants. These include the ‘Protecting Education from Attack’ International Expert Seminar (Paris, France 28 September – 1 October 2009), the ‘Protecting Education from Attack’ Technical Experts Meeting (Human Rights Watch, New York, 11 February 2010) and the INEE Global Consultation (Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March-2 April, 2009).

The team also ensured a diversity of geographical representation and spoke with people based not only at the headquarters of organizations but also those in the field.

The use of semi-structured interviews allowed researchers to make maximum use of key informants’ limited time by focusing discussions toward the most central areas of inquiry, yet still allowing flexibility to probe the informants’ specific knowledge or expertise. In the structured portion of the interviews researchers were guided by a protocol that sought to systematically collect information on four topics

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3 In addition to these sampling methods, the researchers examined lists of participants from the major conferences on attacks on education to identify additional informants. These include the ‘Protecting Education from Attack’ International Expert Seminar (Paris, France 28 September – 1 October 2009), the ‘Protecting Education from Attack’ Technical Experts Meeting (Human Rights Watch, New York, 11 February 2010) and the INEE Global Consultation (Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March-2 April, 2009).

4 Interview subjects were based in and/or focused their work on Afghanistan, Belgium, Canada, CAR, DRC, France, Hungary, Kenya, Netherlands, OPT, Pakistan, Peru, Somalia, Switzerland, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States.
PART TWO: ISSUES, METHODOLOGY AND TRENDS

areas: appropriate responses to specific types of attacks; data and information required to inform and trigger such responses; current data collection methodologies; and identification of other key responders and monitors of attacks on education. In the non-structured portion of the interviews researchers invited informants to share their insights based on their respective areas of strength, including insights on desired elements of any future global monitoring system. Given political sensitivities and potential security risks, all informants were advised of the confidential and voluntary nature of the interviews.

There are clear limitations to coverage. Given tight timelines, the research team was unable to interview government officials in countries currently experiencing major attacks on education. Researchers also managed to contact only a small number of community actors in these same countries. Thorough inputs from these two constituencies would likely require field visits, which were not practicable within the scope of the study. The research team had identified and attempted to schedule interviews with an additional 149 individuals, including representatives of 85 organizations. These potential informants either did not respond to invitations or were unable to schedule an interview during the study period.
PART TWO: ISSUES, METHODOLOGY AND TRENDS

3. DEFINITION OF ATTACKS ON EDUCATION

The starting point for a future global monitoring system for attacks on education, and therefore for this feasibility study, has to be agreement on a definition of an “attack on education.” That is, agreement on what is to be monitored; on the characteristics and limits of an act or event which is first understood by its nature as constituting an “attack,” and which then demonstrates a sufficiently close nexus with an education community or member of an education community as to constitute an attack “on education.”

To date, a universal definition of an “attack on education” has not been established. The goal here is to offer a definition that satisfies the dual purposes of providing structure and coherence to the feasibility study and of providing a solid foundation for any future monitoring system intending to elicit and strengthen effective responses to such attacks.

The definition of an “attack on education” proposed builds upon the emerging consensus suggested by earlier reports, particularly Protecting Education from Attack—A State of the Art Review (UNESCO, 2010) and Education Under Attack 2010 (O’Malley, 2010), as well as discussions with the reference group for the study. It is proposed that an attack on education be formally defined as:

*any deliberate threat or use of force, including coercive or physical force, carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, religious or criminal reasons, with the intention or reasonably foreseeable effect of harming or intimidating any individual in their capacity as a member of an education community (including service personnel, and security personnel protecting infrastructure, and students and staff whether on the premises or en route) or gravely damaging or creating risk of grave damage to any educational buildings, resources, materials or facilities, including transport.*

To ensure that while capturing relevant phenomena this definition does not result in dilution through the inclusion of activities not meaningfully represented as an “attack on education”, specific exclusions need to be applied to the above. The following activities are considered NOT to represent a deliberate attack on education, for present purposes:

(a) general violence or unruly behavior between, among or involving members of an education community that are isolated in nature or limited in scope and impact;
(b) a threat or use of force against a family or other close associate of a member of an education community unless there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate or impute an intention to harm or intimidate a member of an education community;
(c) a threat or use of force in close proximity to an educational building or facility unless there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate or impute an intention to harm or intimidate a member of an education community or damage any educational buildings, resources, materials or facilities, including transport;
(d) collateral damage to education structures or resources or intimidation or harm to a member of an education community, resulting from natural disasters or general social or political unrest;
(e) a reasonable threat or use of force during military action against an education structure or resource which has been converted to military use by a combatant (where reasonableness is measured by adherence to principles of international humanitarian law, especially regarding proportionality and protection of noncombatants).
PART TWO: ISSUES, METHODOLOGY AND TRENDS

Such precision is warranted for clearly defining the scope of this developing field, and is crucial in providing a coherent basis for the development of indicators in relation to such attacks. However, it is acknowledged that this definition does not serve as a concise statement of the focus of concern. For general purposes, therefore, the following working definition is proposed:

An attack on education comprises intentional threats or uses of physical or coercive force against the members or infrastructures of an education community.

While the scope of any future global monitoring system for attacks on education is likely to be selective in terms of the attacks that it can feasibly monitor, it is important that conceptualization and analysis is framed with respect to a suitably inclusive definition. Accordingly, this definition is not restricted to attacks involving physical force or violence only, but includes the use of coercive force, including abusive use of legal, political or administrative authority in contravention of internationally recognized human rights standards. For example, mass expulsion of students from their educational communities on the basis of ethnic, tribal or religious characteristics may constitute an abusive use of administrative authority and, as such, an attack on education. Similarly, wrongful arrest and detention of teachers or professors may constitute an abusive use of coercive legal authority and as such an attack on education.

The proposed definition also reflects key elements of a “right to education” approach, being inclusive of acts or events which significantly impair the fullest enjoyment by individuals of the right to education. The definition includes all members of education communities in all geographic areas; includes non-physical coercive force; and includes acts or events, regardless of their intent to harm, intimidate or damage if such result is reasonably foreseeable. The definition also includes any deliberate threat or use of force which satisfies the intent requirements of the definition whether or not any actual harm, intimidation or damage result. Throughout, education is seen to include:

- schooling at primary, secondary and tertiary levels; as well as structured programs supporting early childhood development, enhancement of technical and vocational skills, literacy programs and related non-formal activities

However, the definition departs from an explicit ‘right-to-education’ approach in one regard. The definition does not include acts or events which do not involve physical or coercive force or whose resulting harm, intimidation or damage to an educational community is not reasonably foreseeable. For example, a state’s failure to meet its obligation to provide appropriate access to quality education within its territory despite available resources may be a violation of the right to education, but would not be included in our definition of an attack on education. Similarly, a state’s failure to provide adequate security to protect educational communities under threat or attack from a third party may be a violation of the right to education, but would not itself be included as an attack on education for purposes of this study.

The definition departs from an explicit ‘right-to-education’ approach for two reasons. First, because a pure right-to-education approach, including duties to provide and protect education, would pose even

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5 In this regard the proposed definition is similar to, but slightly more inclusive than the definition in Education under Attack 2010, which reported both on “targeted violent attacks” like killing, torture and the burning of buildings as well as coercive acts such as the closure of schools for military operations.
PART TWO: ISSUES, METHODOLOGY AND TRENDS

greater data collection issues and broaden an already broad definition beyond any reasonable hope of identifying, classifying and monitoring attacks on a global scale. Second and more importantly, adopting a pure right-to-education approach to include non-coercive acts or unforeseeable consequences would potentially distort the inherent power – semantic and emotional—of the concept of an “attack.”

Reflecting emerging consensus from international meetings and consultations, attacks on education thus include:

- Forced recruitment of child soldiers and voluntary recruitment of child soldiers under age 15 (as a deliberate use of coercive force, for military reasons, with the reasonably foreseeable effect of harming the educational attainment of students);
- Sexual violence against students, teachers or other individuals in their capacity as members of an education community (as a deliberate use of physical force with the intention of harming members of an education community);
- Actual and threatened looting, seizure, occupation, closure or demolition of educational buildings, resources, materials or facilities, including transport, by force (as a deliberate threat or use of physical force with the intention of damaging or creating risk of grave damage to educational buildings and resources);
- Threat or use of force to prevent attendance at educational buildings or facilities, including transport, by armed or military groups (as a deliberate threat or use of force with the intention of harming or intimidating members of an education community);
- Closure of schools or their takeover for military or security operations by state armed forces or police, or by rebel forces, occupying troops or any armed, military, ethnic, political, religious, criminal or sectarian group (as a deliberate use of physical force with the intention or reasonably foreseeable effect of harming or intimidating members of an education community and damaging or creating risk of grave damage to educational buildings and resources);
- Forced imposition of political programs in schools and education institutions, including by threat or use of arrest, detention, imprisonment or other coercive or physical force (as a deliberate threat or use of force with the intention of harming or intimidating members of an education community); and
- Threat or use of force against an individual in the capacity of a member of an education community, while at or on the way to or from an educational building or facility, including transport, or an educational activity elsewhere (as a deliberate threat or use of force with the intention of harming or intimidating members of an education community).
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4. TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS AND RESPONSES

The purpose of providing a typology is, as discussed earlier, to elaborate key issues and themes relevant to the understanding of attacks on education and, critically, to identifying appropriate responses to such attacks. The presented typology (summarized in Figure 1) addresses not only the issue of attacks (and their motivation and impact) but also responses to them. The two are, as argued earlier, critically connected and, in due course, will be shown to define the two dimensions of the ‘response-based framework’ to be used for subsequent data collection.

4.1 Attacks

Review of relevant literature suggests eight main categories of attack. The first five categories include attacks aimed at human targets while the final three categories are targeted at materials or infrastructure:

- Physical violation: attacks intended or have the foreseeable effect of causing some sort of physical harm to an individual
- Harassment and intimidation: attacks that, while not necessarily causing physical harm, can be considered harmful, threatening and intimidating
- Limits on movement, association or access: attacks on education that interfere with an education community member’s ability to access education
- Ideological or political limits: attacks that interfere with academic freedom or can otherwise be considered an attack on the content or institution of education
- Mass or group limits: attacks that affect people on a mass level, e.g. specifically targeted towards a group of people based on gender/religion/ethnicity/etc
- Damage to buildings and/or facilities
- Damage to materials and resources: attacks that damage educational resources that are not buildings or facilities
- “Limits to access to educational facilities: attacks that prevent actual access to an educational building or facility.
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Figure 1. Summary of Proposed Typology

MOTIVE
- Material Gain
- Resistance
- Control or Power
- War Strategy

ATTACK
- Harming or Intimidating Individuals
- Damaging Educational Infrastructure

IMPACT
- Short-Term
- Long-Term

RESPONSE
- Legal Actors
- Political Actors
- Community, Local Education Institution Actors
- Education System Actors (National/Regional)
- Other Assistance/Response Actors
- Public Awareness/Advocacy Actors

GMS Feasibility Study: Definitions and Typology
## Table 2. Typology of Attacks on Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intent</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Attack/Threat</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Harming or intimidating an individual in their capacity as member of an education community</td>
<td>Physical Violence</td>
<td>Multiple Killings</td>
<td>Mass, multiple or systematic loss of life of members of the education community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual Violence/Rape</td>
<td>Any act of violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to any member of the education community, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. (Adapted from the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women, Article 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Targeted killing of an individual member of the education community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>A member of the education community is arrested, detained or abducted against his/her will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law. (Article 4 - Declaration for the protection of all persons against enforced disappearances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Assault</td>
<td>Any act of physical violence caused to a member of the education community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>The criminal or wrongful act of forcibly taking away another student or other member of the education community through fraud, persuasion or violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forced Recruitment</td>
<td>Forced or compulsory recruitment of anyone under the age of 18 for use, including as labor or for sexual purposes, in armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>The forcible abduction of a person within the education community with the intention to hold them for ransom, or seize them away for the motive of harassment (physically or mentally or sexually), taking them hostage and various other motives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attacks on family members</td>
<td>Any physical violence carried out upon a member of family of an education community with the intent of harassing the education community member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corporal Punishment</td>
<td>Any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however light. Most involves hitting children, with the hand or with an implement. But it can also involve, for example, kicking, shaking or throwing children, scratching, pinching, burning, scalding or forced ingestion.” from the Committee on the Rights of the Child First General Comment on The Convention on the Rights of the Child - paragraph 11. May be accepted within a particular education community as part of school discipline, and therefore not considered an attack.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GMS Feasibility Study: Definitions and Typology

#### PART TWO: ISSUES, METHODOLOGY AND TRENDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harming or intimidating an individual in their capacity as member of an education community</th>
<th>Harassment and Intimidation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Violence</td>
<td>Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention or Imprisonment</td>
<td>An officially sanctioned deprivation of liberty of a member of the education community without just cause or legal basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False charges/abusive prosecution</td>
<td>Instituting criminal or civil proceedings based on information which is false, manufactured or otherwise of suspect validity against a member of an educational community, or which would subject such person to sanction or penalty for conduct which is protected under international legal/human rights standards, or otherwise misusing judicial processes for purposes of intimidating or harassing such person or any other members of an education community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>The act of systematic and/or continued unwanted and annoying actions of a party or a group, including threats and demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal/written Threats (Attributed or anonymous)</td>
<td>Act of intimidation to a member of the education community, or to an educational facility, with the express threat of physical violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>Systematic monitoring and observation of a member of an education community for purposes of intimidation, harassment, or restriction of their internationally recognized human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrary dismissal</td>
<td>Unlawful removal of an academic community member from his/her position without just cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confiscation of materials (books, notes, files, computers)</td>
<td>Removal of any academic materials due to the nature of their content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful search of person, possessions, office, home</td>
<td>An unlawful searching of a member of the education community, including their possessions, office or home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits on Movement, Association or Access</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocking Attendance</td>
<td>Any act with the explicit intent of depriving education by limiting any member of the academic community's ability to attend an educational facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Travel/movement</td>
<td>Restricting the ability of a member of an education community to travel or move freely within or outside of the member's country in contravention of internationally recognized human rights standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on access to/exchange of information</td>
<td>Restricting the ability of a member of an education community to access or share information, educational materials or other knowledge within or outside of the member’s country, in contravention of internationally recognized human rights standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference with professional organizations</td>
<td>Engaging in intimidation or harassment of members of professional organizations associated with an educational community or teachers’ or student unions, for the purpose of disrupting the autonomy and operations of such organizations, in contravention of internationally recognized human rights standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exile (Internal and External)</td>
<td>The enforced removal of a member of the education community's from his/her own country or region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GMS Feasibility Study: Definitions and Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Two: Issues, Methodology and Trends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politization of educational content</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion by threat or use of physical or coercive force in the materials, lessons, trainings or other educational communications content which is selected not on objective assessment of educational merit but on ideological, partisan or otherwise political grounds for the purpose of advancing or reinforcing a particular political authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politization of educational staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The selection, training, promotion or retention of, or provision or denial of other accesses or benefits to education staff, through threat or use of coercive force and based not on objective assessment of professional or educational merit but on ideological, partisan or otherwise political grounds for the purpose of advancing or reinforcing a particular political authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politization of educational institutions, facilities or governance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction or interference with the leadership, administration or operation of educational institutions, facilities, systems and governance, by threat or use of coercive force, for reasons based not on objective assessment of professional or educational goals but on ideological, partisan or otherwise political grounds for the purpose of advancing or reinforcing a particular political authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politization of access to education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction of access to education, including buildings, facilities, materials, lessons, trainings and other opportunities or benefits, by threat or use of coercive force, for reasons based not on objective assessment of professional or educational goals but on ideological, partisan or otherwise political grounds for the purpose of advancing or reinforcing a particular political authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Censorship/denial of academic freedom</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The denial of the freedom of members of an education community to individually, or collectively pursue, develop and transmit knowledge and ideas, through research, teaching, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation or writing, freely express opinions about the institution or system in which they work, fulfill their functions without discrimination or fear of repression by the state or any other actor, participate in professional or representative academic bodies and enjoy all of the internationally recognized human rights applicable to other individuals in the same jurisdiction (taken and adapted from Bieter, pg. 485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Any Group Attack/Threat</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any attack/threat including physical violence aimed at groups based on gender/ethnicity/religion etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of physical or coercive force for personal gain which harms or intimidates a member of an educational community or causes grave damage or risk of grave damage to education buildings, resources, materials or facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suppression of Strikes/Protests</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of violent or coercive force to suppress, disrupt, intimidate or otherwise harm strikes or protests conducted in an otherwise peaceful and orderly fashion by or including members of an education community acting in that capacity, including student and faculty groups, unions and associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass expulsions from educational facilities/programs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass or group removals of members of an education community from an educational facility or program by use of physical or coercive force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disruption or closure of educational facilities/programs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of physical or coercive force to disrupt or force closure of educational facilities or programs for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, religious or criminal reasons not directly related to the safety of members of the educational community or the proper administration of educational programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ideological or Political Limits

<p>| Harming or intimidating an individual in their capacity as member of an education community |
| Any Group Attack/Threat |
| Any attack/threat including physical violence aimed at groups based on gender/ethnicity/religion etc. |
| Corruption |
| The use of physical or coercive force for personal gain which harms or intimidates a member of an educational community or causes grave damage or risk of grave damage to education buildings, resources, materials or facilities |
| Suppression of Strikes/Protests |
| The use of violent or coercive force to suppress, disrupt, intimidate or otherwise harm strikes or protests conducted in an otherwise peaceful and orderly fashion by or including members of an education community acting in that capacity, including student and faculty groups, unions and associations |
| Mass expulsions from educational facilities/programs |
| Mass or group removals of members of an education community from an educational facility or program by use of physical or coercive force |
| Disruption or closure of educational facilities/programs |
| The use of physical or coercive force to disrupt or force closure of educational facilities or programs for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, religious or criminal reasons not directly related to the safety of members of the educational community or the proper administration of educational programs |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intent</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Attack/Threat</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(B) Damaging or creating risk of grave damage to any educational infrastructure including educational buildings, resources, materials or facilities</td>
<td>Damage to Materials and Resources</td>
<td>Assault/damage/destruction on vehicles</td>
<td>Violence on any automotive associated with education programs or an academic institution, including: school bus, aid vehicle, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Looting of facility</td>
<td>Theft of any part of academic institution including equipment, furniture, books, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction/damage to educational materials</td>
<td>Full or partial damage or destruction to any educational materials, including, but not limited to papers, books, maps, diagrams, computers and related files and equipment, supplies (and building materials for educational buildings and facilities.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Damage to Buildings and/or Facilities</td>
<td>Destruction/damage to buildings</td>
<td>Full or partial damage or destruction to any part of an educational facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits on Access to Educational Facilities</td>
<td>Obstruction of access to educational facilities by Armed Group</td>
<td>The blocking of access to an educational facility to members of an education community by Armed Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation of Education Facility by Armed Group</td>
<td>Use of educational facility for the purposes of military action, thereby suspending education activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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For some purposes the above level of specification of attacks will be sufficient as a means of conceptual framing. However, in many circumstances details of the perpetrators of attacks, target of attacks, impacts, motives and relationship to international law will all be relevant in considering the information required to trigger appropriate response. The following sections consider these issues in turn.

4.1.1 Perpetrators of the attacks
In order for professionals to respond to attacks it is potentially important to understand who the potential perpetrators are. In general, the main categories of perpetrators are identified as:

- Government, State Security or Military Personnel
- Non-state Armed Forces
- Religious Groups

Our initial attempt to associate specific attacks with these groupings was abandoned. While some attacks – such as formal detention or imprisonment and exile - generally require the authority of the state for their perpetration, most of the attacks listed can be perpetrated by any of the above groupings.

4.1.2 Targets of the attacks
Similarly, most attacks can be directed towards any or all members of the education community. For purposes of formulating appropriate response, potential targets may appropriately be considered within two categories: (a) those involved in the direct provision of education (through preparation, delivery and reception of educational content) and (b) those involved in indirect provision or support of education.

Table 3. Potential Targets of Attacks on Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Provision of Education</th>
<th>Indirect Provision/Support of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>School Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/Instructor/Professor</td>
<td>Teacher/Instructor/Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Education institution or system leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Union Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education Aid Worker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3 Motives for Attacks on Education
The definition we have developed for an attack on education states that an attack is an action carried out for a reason, specifically for “political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, religious or criminal reasons”. In addition to overall reason for attack, there is a specific motive for each attack, which may be as simple as “to create fear” or “to obtain money”. It is also important to recognize that perpetrators may have many motives for committing a given attack. Understanding the motives and reasons behind attacks on education is important to inform appropriate responses.

However, understanding and monitoring the motives for attacks on education is a difficult endeavor. Gaining firsthand knowledge of the motive for an attack may prove difficult, but not impossible. In some instances alleged perpetrators may provide interviews (with media, for example), press releases, video or audio, letters or other written statements, including threats. Contemporaneous confidential records discovered at a later date are among the other potential sources for direct information. But in many cases, information on motives which comes directly from the perpetrator may not be available. Information about motives may be gained from the testimony of witnesses, local residents and those
familiar with the conflict or political environment, but it will generally be difficult for a monitor to document the specific motive(s) for a specific attack on these sources alone.

In addition it can be difficult to even gain information on who the perpetrator is, for the same reasons why gaining any information about certain attacks is difficult. Often attacks occur in remote or insecure areas. Yet without understanding who carried out an attack, it will generally be difficult to gauge the reasons behind an attack.

Table 4 presents a preliminary categorization of motives for attacks on education for use in the course of the feasibility study based upon literature review. It is clear in reviewing this framework that motivations can be included in more than one category. For example, the motivation for sexual violence can be considered a war strategy as well as a method to maintain power or control over a population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motives for Attacks on Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resistance to perceived, or real, imposition of governance, culture, religion, philosophy, or other identity or idea</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material Gain</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To maintain or impose control or power over governance, resources, thought, culture or other power structure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War/Conflict Strategy</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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4.2.4 Impacts

There is a great deal of evidence available on the many different impacts that can result from an attack. However, this evidence is heavily qualitative, predominantly based on interviews and testimony. There has been little quantitative research linking attacks to impacts. In particular, there has been little research into the long-term impacts of attacks, such as lower levels of teacher retention and reduced educational attainment.

Given these limitations, integrating analysis of impacts into an overall typology of attacks is especially difficult. However, there remains clear value in better articulating the impacts of attacks on education (for advocacy and other purposes). Based upon literature review, it appears warranted to distinguish between short- and long-term impacts of attacks. The listing below summarizes some of the impacts that have been noted in reports under these broad headings:

Immediate (Short-Term) Impacts
- Loss of life
- Injury
- Increased vulnerability to conflict and recruitment
- Loss of places in which to learn
- Damage/loss of learning materials, equipment, furniture, research materials, etc.
- Psychosocial impacts on members of the education community
- Prevention of attendance/learning
- Reduced/delayed enrollment
- Increased student dropout rates and lower progression rates through grades
- Closed educational facilities
- Damaged educational facilities
- Suppression of research, dissemination of knowledge
- Degradation of teaching quality including teacher attrition and absenteeism
- Lower education attainment
- Isolation of schools and members of academic community from colleagues, support and supervision
- Suspension of aid and funding and resources

Longer-Term Impacts
- Difficulties of recruiting teachers and other educational professionals
- Psychological effects
- Long-term absenteeism (education professionals and students)
- Replacement of buildings or their repair is delayed
- Exacerbation of state fragility
- Ideological, economic, cultural, and social effects of degradation of education for entire cohorts/groups
- Disruption of education/employment cycles
- Removal of aid workers
- Degradation of investment
- Silencing of teachers
- Financial costs of all impacts (rebuilding, services, security, support, economic loss, etc.)
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- Destruction of intellectual capital
- Limiting economic and social development
- Migration of education professionals (“brain drain”)

An alternative, or complementary, means of categorizing the impacts of attacks is to note the sorts of effects attacks bring about. The literature suggests that, in these terms, it is possible to seek to distinguish between:

- physical effects, including physical damage to individuals and to infrastructure;
- psychosocial effects, including short- and long-term psychological impacts;
- financial effects, including impacts that deplete financial and economic resources and livelihoods;
- educational effects that are felt in educational provision and attainment;
- development effects, including consequences that impede or reverse the sustainable development of a country or region;
- fragility effects, including impacts that contribute to the fragility of peaceful governance, culture and community and which heighten the likelihood of further conflict.

4.2.5 International Law

The grouping of types of attacks in relation to relevant international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law is an alternative means of categorization, but also problematic. There are several factors that make the categorization of specific attacks on education under specific laws difficult but, essentially, nearly every attack on education can be considered a violation of some international law, as the protection of civilians, the protection of educational buildings, the protection of children and the right to education all occur in various instruments of international law.

4.3 Responses

There are clearly a number of alternative bases for categorization of response to attacks on education. Following on from discussion with members of the reference group, the approach taken here is to propose core ‘domains’ for response that constitute specific actors and perspectives on such attacks. The preliminary categories identified comprise: legal responses, political responses, local community and education actors, education system responses, and public awareness, or advocacy, responses.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response category</th>
<th>Examples of response⁶</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Legal actors**⁷                              | - Criminal prosecution or civil litigation in international, regional, and domestic courts  
- Accountability through international, regional, and domestic human rights mechanisms  
- Action taken by education system-specific administrative processes  
- Accountability through transitional justice mechanisms  
- Action to promote legal reform at international, regional, or national levels (or in regulations within institutions) |
| **Political actors**                           | - Sanctions and embargoes  
- Monitoring and reporting of states  
- Education policy  
- Education budgets  
- Peace agreements  
- Accountability through ILO-UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations Concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART)  
- Lobbying regarding measures to prevent attacks directed at local constituencies and domestic political bodies on the part of NGOs, professional associations, unions, etc. |
| **Community/Education Institution Actors – Local Level (e.g. school)** | - Enhanced security through community provision of armed guards at schools or en route to and from school/college, keeping strangers out of village, etc  
- Community negotiations with armed groups in the area to protect schools and takes related measures (eg changing name or modalities of operation of school to meet cultural concerns)  
- School management committee (including community members) action to enhance safety of buildings, organizes volunteer guards, escorts  
- Relocation of school/college to alternative site or in homes or community facilities; school/college timings are adjusted for safety reasons |

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⁶ Not comprehensive.

⁷ Note that many of the legal responses, especially those implicating accountability for states in international human rights processes, can also be considered political responses. Likewise, some political responses, including undertaken by UN mechanisms such as the Security Council and based on a legal mandate, can also be considered legal responses.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response category</th>
<th>Examples of response[^8]</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Education system actors (Ministry of Education, UN, NGOs...)** | - Rapid re-supply and ongoing provision of education materials  
- Provision of temporary classroom shelter (school tents, plastic sheeting...), rehabilitation and reconstruction of buildings  
- Regional/national measures to improve safety and security of schools/colleges and en route, including through security/military  
- Psychosocial support: safe spaces for children, inclusion of psychosocial elements in education programmes (for students and teachers)  
- Staffing: hire replacement teachers, redeploy displaced teachers, ensure payment of teacher salaries, introduce code of conduct for teachers  
- Adjusting timings of academic year and examinations to minimize disruption to students’ progress  
- Ensuring education of refugee and internally displaced students, including arrangements for recognition/certification of studies  
- Staff, staff union or student interventions to protect members of the education community  
- Training programmes for teachers –in-service, pre-service, distance learning, to meet acute and longer term needs  
- Renewal of curricula and textbooks to meet crisis-related needs; removing bias and including health/safety/environment/conflict resolution/humanitarian and human rights principles and law  
- Measures to promote equitable access to education (gender, ethnicity, poverty, disability, etc)  
- Safety of education records (teachers, students) through duplicate copies in safe location etc |

[^8]: Not comprehensive.
Table 5. Response category and examples of response

These response domains are briefly elaborated below.

4.3.1 Legal Responses

There are few international legal standards explicitly protecting individuals in their specific capacity as members of education communities. All members of education communities are however protected under international law from harassment, intimidation, physical harm and other violations by general application of human rights standards applicable to all persons, including those applicable to persons based on age, gender, race or other protected status. At the national level, there are at least three possible avenues through which legal or quasi-legal responses to attacks on education may be based. The first avenue may include non-binding but widely recognized statements of educational rights, such as those adopted or promulgated by educational ministries, academic societies or associations, or staff unions.

Second, national or sub-national constitutions or educational statutes may include explicit protections for educational rights and personnel at various levels of education. Third, many countries maintain national human rights institutions –commissions, committees, departments, ombudsman—whose mandate may include attacks on education and violations of educational rights, including possible power to receive and review individual complaints.

4.3.2 Political Responses

There are political responses to attacks on education that can occur at the national, regional and global levels. International responses require bi-lateral or multilateral diplomacy. Actors at country level may be concerned with reporting to international entities or processes; developing policies that respond to

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9 Not comprehensive.
attacks on education; or in some cases, negotiating aspects of future education policy as part of a peace process.

4.3.3 Local Community and Education Responses

Community responses include both immediate actions to respond to an attack and long-term actions with aims including prevention or advocacy. Examples include developing community watch groups or taking community ownership of schools. At the level of individual education institutions, measures must be taken to enhance security.
4.3.4 Education Actors’ Responses

Responses can include those responses aimed at providing emergency aid to attacked communities and to providing longer-term responses aimed at prevention and effective response. National responses may include adjustments to educational resource allocation, to ensure more equitable access to educational opportunity of marginalized groups; curriculum measures, and training teachers to in the short term to respond to potential threats and in the longer term to promote tolerance and a peaceful society. Reforms may strengthen institutional autonomy and governance of education institutions. Professional groups and unions may play a role in these reforms, for example by advocating for local, regional, and national policies or regulations on the protection of education, education professionals and education values, or by lobbying legislatures and policymakers to achieve these or other measures.

Responses to physical or coercive force attacks on education professionals may include measures to protect their physical security at their home institution, like training staff to assess risks and to ensure their own protection or provision of satellite phones, bullet-proof vests or bodyguards, or assistance in evacuating to a safer location within or outside the country. Strengthening internal complaint procedures may provide early warning of some types of attacks on academics and teachers.

4.3.5 Other Response/Assistance

A wide range of non-education actors can help respond to attacks on education, from UN agencies concerned with health and nutrition, to donors who provide the needed foundation for much humanitarian response.

4.3.6 Public Awareness/Advocacy Responses

Public awareness and advocacy responses are those responses that are aimed specifically at exposing attacks on education to various constituencies. Some, such as media reports, expose attacks as items of noteworthy news. Others, such as some human rights NGO reports, are generally intended to achieve
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some form of advocacy. Other forms include action alerts, letter and email campaigns, events, videos, lobbying, workshops and trainings. Many of these responses aim ultimately for an additional legal, political or other response, but the first and primary response itself is to expose, and inform about, the original attack.
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5. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

In preparing the stakeholder analysis, the research team relied on literature review and stakeholder input to develop an understanding of which organizations are gathering information on attacks on education, where and how they are doing so, and for what purposes. Key informant interviews were initially designed to assess stakeholders’ experience with attacks on education; understand and record the types of attacks within that experience; understand and record current responses to those types of attacks, as well as stakeholders’ views of other possible responses; understand and record the data required to effectively inform and trigger such responses; map stakeholders and identify additional subjects for future interviews.

In practice however interviews quickly revealed that while many stakeholders collect partial information on some types of attacks on education, generally on a case-by-case or irregular basis, few if any stakeholders systematically collect information on the many different and specific types of attacks on education in the typology. The research team therefore used the interviews largely to develop understanding of current data collection and the kinds of data needed to improve responses to attacks in the future. This focus on current monitoring provided information used to examine critically the various data collection methods in use, and to provide analysis as to the benefits and shortcomings of different approaches.

Secondary documents were identified through searches of academic, UN and NGO sources. Analysis of secondary documentation informed the design of the interview framework which is described below.

The key informant interviews were semi-structured conversations with key actors and experts on their monitoring of and/or responses to attacks on education. Information from these subjects helped the research team to assess the effectiveness of its typology in encompassing all types of attacks; to define what constitute “appropriate responses” to specific types of attacks on education; and to identify current sources of information on attacks, major gaps in current monitoring efforts, and data that would be required to inform and trigger more robust responses in the future. By focusing in particular on these three inter-related monitoring concerns—current sources, current gaps, and information needs—the requirements of a functional monitoring system would be clarified.

The research team used purposive, non-probability sampling to systematically identify key actors and experts whom together hold a rich body of knowledge on the subject. The feasibility study reference group identified an initial group of key informants and thereafter snowball sampling was employed to identify additional interview subjects. The research team interviewed 54 key actors and experts in this manner, including representatives of 38 organizations. Interview subjects included intergovernmental agency staff, academics and other education actors, humanitarian actors, human rights advocates and local civil society actors. The team also ensured a diversity of geographical representation and spoke with people based not only at the headquarters of organizations but also those in the field. In addition to these sampling methods, the researchers examined lists of participants from the major conferences on attacks on education to identify additional informants. These included the ‘Protecting Education from Attack’ International Expert Seminar (Paris, France 28 September – 1 October 2009), the

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10 See Table 1 above for summary of organizational affiliations of interviewees.
11 Interview subjects were based in and/or focused their work on Afghanistan, Belgium, Canada, CAR, DRC, France, Hungary, Kenya, Netherlands, OPT, Pakistan, Peru, Somalia, Switzerland, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States.
‘Protecting Education from Attack’ Technical Experts Meeting (Human Rights Watch, New York, 11 February 2010) and the INEE Global Consultation (Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March-2 April, 2009).

The use of semi-structured interviews allowed researchers to make maximum use of key informants’ limited time by focusing discussions toward the most central areas of inquiry, yet still allowing flexibility to probe the informants’ specific knowledge or expertise. In the structured portion of the interviews researchers were guided by a protocol that sought to systematically collect information on four areas: appropriate responses to specific types of attacks; data and information required to inform and trigger such responses; current data collection methodologies; and identification of other key responders and monitors of attacks on education. In the non-structured portion of the interviews researchers invited informants to share their insights based on their respective areas of strength, including insights on desired elements of any future global monitoring system. Given political sensitivities and potential security risks, all informants were advised of the confidential and voluntary nature of the interviews.

There are clear limitations to the reported research. Given tight timelines, the research team was unable to interview government officials in countries currently experiencing major attacks on education. Researchers also managed to contact only a small number of community actors in these same countries. Thorough inputs from these two constituencies would likely require field visits, which were not practicable within the scope of the feasibility study. The research team had identified and attempted to schedule interviews with an additional 149 individuals, including representatives of 85 organizations. These potential informants either did not respond to invitations or were unable to schedule an interview during the study period.

Stakeholders analysed by the research team, using secondary sources and mostly drawing on interviews with staff members, are listed below. This is clearly a subset of the organizations working on the issue of attacks on education, but hopefully serves to indicate the range of issues to be considered. There are certainly many stakeholders at international level and national level, including local civil society and education organizations, which have not been reached. Government Ministries of Education, educational institutions, teachers and education staff, students and families are all crucial stakeholders who often endure the greatest impact of attacks on education. However the sampling strategy employed was designed to include, within the time and resources available, many of the key global stakeholders active on the issue of attacks on education, and relevant to the overall question of the feasibility of establishing a global monitoring system. A total of 37 organizations were included in the analysis, comprising12:

**UN/intergovernmental**: ICRC13, IRIN, OSRSG-CAAC, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHCHR, UN Human Rights Council, UNICEF, UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Education


12 For list of abbreviations, see Annex ...
13 ICRC has a unique status. It is included here reflecting its mandate from governments to provide protection and assistance to victims of conflicts.
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*Unions*: Canadian Association of University Teachers, Education International, European Students Union.

*Donors*: NORAD, USAID.
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6. CURRENT MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING ATTACKS ON EDUCATION

Attacks on education are documented via multiple mechanisms which serve different purposes and range greatly in methodological rigor. This section is not intended to be a compendium of all the ways in which data on attacks could be recorded, nor a definitive analysis of such methods. Rather, this section discusses summaries and examples of the most common and effective methods in use today, as revealed via key informant interviews and document review. Most methods are reviewed in two sections: methodology and analysis. The first gives a brief synopsis of how data is collected including the methodology, ethical issues, data analysis or other methodological concerns. The second provides analysis of the data collection method, focusing on strengths and weaknesses and relating each method to particular types of attacks and responses. The discussion includes both objective discussion of how methodologies are designed to be implemented, as well as more subjective opinions and insights gained through key informants’ statements.

6.1 Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM)

UN Security Council Resolution 1612 established the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) to provide the Security Council with information on six grave violations on children in armed conflict, including “attacks on schools and hospitals”\(^\text{14,15}\). The legal foundations, methodology, implementation, challenges and strengths of the MRM have been detailed extensively elsewhere, and will not be repeated here.\(^\text{16}\) This section is not an overall review or critique, but a review of the MRM as a potential source and model for data collection on attacks on education.

6.1.1 MRM Methodology

The MRM may be implemented in countries named in the Annexes of the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict. Monitoring is managed by an inter-agency country taskforce. Taskforces are not identical in every country where the MRM is established, although they typically include UNICEF and other UN agencies, and have connections to NGOs and local civil society actors.

How information flows from the scene of an attack to a country taskforce is context-specific and therefore differs by country. Interview subjects stated that in most cases, the initial report of an incident comes from local NGOs or civil society. Information that ends up reported to the MRM can flow both in and out of many UN-agency offices. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt),\(^\text{17}\) for example, UNESCO reported that they receive data on attacks on education from the UN Education Cluster and other working groups but they also report data to the Education Cluster and MRM, in addition to partner organizations and local communities.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^\text{15}\) The MRM monitors violations on children under the age of 18. As a result the focus of MRM monitoring is on primary and secondary education, and tertiary education is generally excluded. However attacks on school teachers and staff are also included as categories of information reported to the OSRS-G-CAAC.
\(^\text{17}\) Not formally part of the MRM system, oPt/Israel report on a voluntary basis, as do Haiti, Lebanon and Thailand.
\(^\text{18}\) See below for more information on the Education Cluster.
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Verification is an essential component of UN monitoring and the MRM. MRM reporting requires that all data is “UN-verified”. This usually requires a member of the country taskforce to verify reported incidents personally, generally via in-person interviews with victims and witnesses and/or site visits to the reported incident locations. This country taskforce member does not need to be a UN staff member but can be someone trained on the MRM and accepted as a taskforce monitor. UN staff, or identified monitors, may use multiple sources to triangulate and confirm all information regarding an alleged attack or incident, although verification is not identical across country taskforces. Some taskforces meet to review the details of every reported case, while others have decentralized the process and require field based staff to verify information they submit to the taskforce.  

Once the country taskforce collects data, this information is then submitted to the Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG-CAAC). The OSRSG-CAAC submits bi-monthly horizontal country reports and periodic country specific reports to the Secretary-General and the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. The Secretary-General also submits a regular report on children and armed conflict. The Working Group considers these reports and makes recommendations to the UN Security Council. The Security Council may then consider the recommendations and decide what, if any, actions to take to improve the protection of children.

6.1.2 MRM Analysis

Before discussing the quality and efficacy of the MRM for monitoring attacks on education, it is necessary to first discuss its purpose. The MRM is not designed to monitor and record each and every incident of the six grave violations. Knowledgeable informants consistently stated that the purpose of the MRM is to provide accountability. Therefore, the purpose of producing reports to the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict is not simply to inform the Security Council about the in-country situation but to help the Security Council take actions that will lead towards accountability for violations.

This focus on accountability explains the strict verification procedures in the MRM, in that information provided to the Working Group must be documented in particular ways to enable the Security Council to take additional actions. In many countries, this requirement of UN verification automatically limits the number of incidents that can be reported. For example, in the DRC, a child protection officer must interview every victim and/or witness, but there is currently only one such officer per province in the geographically vast country. Distances and security concerns often make it impossible for officers to reach victims and verify attacks, while information provided by local civil society members to UN officers will not be used unless it can be UN-verified. Multiple informants stated, however, that the MRM does not require complete documentation of 100% of the prevalence of attacks to function well, or better. These informants claimed that several well-documented, UN-verified cases (perhaps only to 20%) may be sufficient to trigger the political action that results from the MRM.

The MRM is a “passive” monitoring system, meaning it stands static until information is brought to UN officers, as opposed to an “active” surveillance system that affirmatively seeks out relevant information in an ongoing manner. The MRM is also a voluntary reporting mechanism, meaning that there is no

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20 This report is sometimes referred to as the “Annual Report” but it has not been issued annually.
21 One informant stated that while the overwhelming focus of the MRM is on UN-verified attacks, significant evidence of attacks that cannot be verified may still be included in an MRM report, but identified as “unverified.”
mandate to report and agencies decide themselves whether to participate. As a result, the MRM may miss out on a large section of available information (and sources of information). Many MRM informants stated that they were advocating for improved coordination between local civil society and the MRM by encouraging the MRM to try to receive “statically” more information that is “actively” gathered by civil society actors, including local NGOs and activists. Many MRM informants believe that the best way to improve the MRM is to increase this form of engagement.

There are several issues however that currently hinder such engagement. First there are issues of verification, validity and reliability. Only a limited number of people are trained on how to collect data for the MRM as it is currently structured, and only a few UN actors are able to access the required training. Moreover, given the challenging nature of this work, there is a high turnover of these staff. Education practitioners, for instance, generally do not have the legal knowledge required for MRM-required UN-verification. There is a gap therefore between what could potentially be gathered by local civil society for more general reporting purposes and what can actually be used by the MRM in its current form. There is also a sense, with both the MRM and the UN Education Cluster, that the movement of information between local organizations and UN mechanisms is not sufficiently systematized. Informants stated that the movement of data to and from all of the involved organizations is often random and that there should be a better system in place to systematically disseminate data.

Second, humanitarian INGO staff expressed serious ethical concerns about contributing data to the MRM or to other groups, such as the UN Education Cluster. Field staff in conflict and emergency zones are amongst the most well positioned to encounter and record information on attacks on education. However, the security of these staff members is of the highest importance and could be endangered through involvement in monitoring and reporting on attacks on education or other violations. Indeed, many organizations will not contribute to the MRM or other mechanisms because of security concerns. Humanitarian organizations also often strive to be viewed as neutral parties to any conflict. They worry that the reporting of incident data could jeopardize their ability to deliver services and may even result in the organization being expelled from the country by the host government or ruling force, as recently occurred in Sudan and Somalia.

Most essential, there is little impetus for local partners to engage with the MRM because there is benefit at the local level. To date, the MRM has not resulted in significant change or impact for those working on the ground. It takes months before violations are taken up the Security Council level, if they are at all, and the resulting action has little effect on those who reported violations. People have at times put themselves at risk to report and, although there is a benefit to accumulating more data on the incidence of violations, it may not seem worthwhile to those reporting to jeopardize themselves or their positions to submit a report if nothing concrete results. The pacing of the MRM as a response to attacks on education was also cited repeatedly as a major impediment.

Despite these and other shortcomings, the majority of concerned informants believe that the MRM is essential and that these challenges should not be perceived as “failures” but instead as areas of learning and potential improvement.

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22 Many NGOs are reluctant to provide information to MRM monitors because of, among other reasons, potential security risks and an unwillingness to serve as government informants.
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6.2 Education Cluster

In December 2005 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals welcomed the cluster approach as a mechanism to address identified gaps in response and enhance the quality of humanitarian response to disaster and conflict situations. It is part of a wider humanitarian reform process aimed at improving the effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability and accountability, while at the same time strengthening partnerships between NGOs, international organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the UN. The Education Cluster is co-chaired at the global level by UNICEF and Save the Children, and country level clusters have been established in 42 countries.23

6.2.1 Education Cluster: Methodology

Education cluster members collect data relating to attacks on education, with a view to ensuring speedy return of the education system to normal function. Much of the work of the cluster involves coordinating humanitarian response, such as re-supply of education materials, temporary learning spaces, teacher training and refurbishing educational buildings that may have been attacked. In Afghanistan for example, the education cluster relied on partners to report when a school was attacked. The data collection methods were ad hoc at best, such as from community leaders providing information via cell phones or from civil society actors present in the area. The information would be shared at cluster meetings. If partners were active in these areas, the information would help to focus emergency assistance.

In some cases, where an education cluster has received information on attacks on education it has been able to lobby the government for protection. For example, in the DRC, the education cluster had information that using schools as polling sites made them more vulnerable to attacks. The cluster was able to lobby the government successfully in some cases to move voting locations outside of schools. Information about attacks on education has also helped education cluster members to lobby donor countries. During an emergency, for example, education may not be considered a life-saving intervention and may thus be sidelined in flash funding appeals. Instead of education, initial funding may go to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health, food and/or shelter. Education cluster members have recently used data on attacks on education to inform country donors on the need for early humanitarian intervention on behalf of education.

In some cases, a broader range of UN clusters have been able to set up more coordinated response mechanisms which have resulted in more comprehensive monitoring as well as prevention and response actions. In the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), for example, if an attack on civil society is reported (including house or school demolitions), a rapid assessment is conducted either by ICRC, OCHA or UNRWA. A child protection or education assessment is also conducted. The appropriate cluster is then alerted and a response is planned between partners which may include a range of material, educational, legal and or psychosocial assistance. UNESCO has helped to develop assessment forms and guidelines to tailor responses for each type of attack or violent activity affecting civilians. It also has developed trainings to help local civil society monitor attacks and report on attacks to the cluster.24

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23 At the time of writing, education clusters are active in 38 countries, including ... affected by conflict.
24 UNESCO data is sent to the MRM and the Education Cluster.
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Since 2007, a UNICEF-led working group has consolidated efforts to monitor and report on grave violations against children in Israel and the oPt. The violations that are being monitored include killing and injuries, arrest and detention, ill-treatment and torture, recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups, attacks on educational facilities and hospitals, displacement, and denial of humanitarian access including access to health and education. The bulletin is published on a bi-monthly basis, highlighting trends and patterns in grave violations against children during the reporting period. The working group has a sophisticated method of verifying information through triangulation of sources.

6.2.2 Education Cluster: analysis

One of the biggest obstacles to cluster reporting of attacks on education is verification of data. Verification issues largely result from insecurity in the countries of operation. If UN or international NGOs are unable to access the places where the attacks reportedly took place, due to insecurity or government restrictions, then they will be unable to verify the attacks. In some cases obtaining community verification is also a concern. In Afghanistan, for example, some affected communities did not want to tell the UN verifiers that an attack had taken place, due to insecurity, fear of retribution and a lack of trust in UN actors. This was also the case in Somalia, where on site verification could place ongoing programs at risk. In such cases, a cluster coordinator may only discuss the information that comes to him informally or “under the table,” with insufficient means to verify it.

Agencies, including humanitarian INGOs, are also at risk of being expelled if they provide information on attacks on education. In hopes of keeping their programs operational, some cluster members have tried to maintain an appearance of neutrality, and thus have purposefully shied away from reporting attacks. In Somalia, for example, the cluster coordinator has repeatedly asked members for incidence data for attacks, but no partner agencies have come forward to provide it. The risk of repercussions in Somalia is so high that even attacks against international humanitarian offices are sometimes not reported.

Ethical issues associated with UN Cluster system reporting are similar to those associated with MRM reporting. Retribution is a distinct possibility and communities are less likely to take risks when they do not see direct and tangible benefits to doing so. The ability (or inability) to provide timely and relevant follow-up is a key ethical concern and a factor in community participation in reporting attacks on education.

At the same time, the cluster mechanism may be best suited to collect and disseminate information on attacks on education. It has the most contact with actors – both international and local – in the various countries, and has been especially effective when there is a dedicated information management unit or (at least) staff member. In some cases, the cluster may also be in a comparatively strong position with government and thus the information that it collects may be used to advocate effectively for protection of education. However, in countries where the government may be committing abuses itself, or where there is no accountable government to begin with, cluster actors have found it difficult to use information at their disposal to advocate for accountability. Additionally, the cluster mechanism currently relies on the voluntary efforts of its members, an approach that is not well suited to address verification and reliability challenges.

The working group includes Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights, Save the Children, DCI-Palestine, B’Tselem, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, War Child Holland, OCHA, OHCHR, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNRWA and WHO.
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6.3 Intergovernmental Thematic Reports

Intergovernmental agencies are in the unique position to issue thematic reports utilizing information that is gathered throughout the UN system. Unlike NGOs, UN agencies may be able to access the internal data and resources of multiple UN agencies. Reviewed here are two examples of UN thematic reports related to attacks on education.

6.3.1 UNESCO Education Under Attack (EUA) Reports

6.3.1.1 EUA Methodology

UNESCO’s Education Under Attack (EUA) report (O’Malley, 2010) was the first global study on attacks on education. It attempted to measure the nature and scale of attacks in the ten years leading up to its release in 2007. UNESCO produced a second report in 2010 covering the years 2007 to 2009. The EUA reports provide a model for monitoring attacks on education via desk research. The most recent report required a year to produce by a single research consultant working nearly full-time, with UNESCO staff providing oversight and editing. The report’s methodology combined the compilation of secondary data from media, NGO reports and UN reports, and primary information from UNICEF, the Education Cluster, UNESCO field offices and NGO consultations.

The EUA researcher conducted extensive internet searches to identify attacks on education that are reported in the media, generally using a search engine, typically Google, rather than a news aggregator, such as Lexis-Nexus (although for some countries aggregators were used to survey national English-language media). There was no systematic set of sources or search methodology. Attempts were made to develop key words that were particularly effective in producing results within the Google algorithm, but these proved unsuccessful because the vocabulary for describing victims and attacks varies too much by context and country. The media sources used were primarily English-language. Attempts at searching Spanish and French-language media sources generated few results. Media coverage of attacks also varied from country to country. For example, the international press carried considerable information on attacks on education in Afghanistan, likely due to the Western involvement there, while national English-language press in Thailand provided considerably more information on attacks in that country than did the international media.

The report did not automatically include all data included in media reports or through any one source. Potential country-based monitors (referred to in the report as “field agents”) were identified through a snowball methodology aimed at producing a network of contacts. When field agents provided information on an attack, the EUA researcher used media reports to confirm data. The accuracy of the research is further improved through repeated review of drafts, and revisions which remove less reliable attack data. In addition to media reports and field informants, EUA research included document reviews including annual U.S. State Department human rights reports, the semi-annual Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reports, Asian Human Rights Network reports, Education International bulletins and other publicly available reports. The EUA research methods used to gain information on attacks on higher education differed somewhat. Because these attacks often target specific individuals, such as an academic researching a particularly sensitive topic, and are often committed by repressive regimes that also restrict media freedom, they were less likely to be thoroughly reported in the media. The EUA researcher instead relied on relevant organizations, such as Education International, to provide information on attacks on higher education.

6.3.1.2 EUA: Analysis
The Education Under Attack report has been used primarily for awareness-raising and advocacy. Informants stated that EUA established a baseline of evidence that advocates used to increase understanding about the nature and scope of attacks on education, including the fact that attacks are often intentional. As such, advocates argue, attacks on education should be viewed as tactics of repression and/or armed conflict which warrant greater and more timely response. As the information in the report is historical, it is not timely enough to inform “real time” humanitarian and emergency education responses to the incidents reported. However it may inform retroactive responses, such as investigations aimed at establishing legal or other accountability, and prescriptive responses, such as changes in policy or practice to reduce the likelihood of future attacks.

There are many limitations, acknowledged by UNESCO, inherent in EUA’s methodological reliance on media reports. Information that appears in the media reports is dependent on its news value. Media will not report on countries, situations or attacks that are not deemed noteworthy by editors and publishers. A single, isolated attack may be given prominent coverage as something new or unusual, while the most recent in a long pattern of widely felt attacks may not be covered at all. The detail, length and quality of information in a story are all are dependent on a variety of factors including the media outlet, journalistic traditions and the level of media freedom in the country, and the other news events of the day.

There is also an inherent selection bias in the media. The international media reporting in Western media will have a bias towards countries that are geopolitically involved with the Western world. This bias can be partly rectified in some countries by surveying local press, however many countries that are not a focus for international media, including many African countries, do not have robust domestic media (especially not online). Attacks in these countries are likely underreported in both international and national press. Reliance on primarily English-language media in the EUA report may worsen selection bias, as attacks occurring in Francophone or Spanish-speaking countries are much less likely to be carried in the English media than attacks occurring in countries of greater interest to an English-speaking audience. This may be even more true of attacks in Chinese, Russian or Arabic-speaking countries, or in minority-language communities within certain countries.

Key word searches also present limitations. Key words are context-specific, as the words used to describe attacks on education vary by country. A “student” in one country is a “pupil” in another. “College,” “university,” “academic,” “professor,” and “lecturer” are just a few examples of country-specific terms.

The quality of media reporting as a basis for quantitative studies is mixed. Media reports are single, snapshot descriptions. They may provide accurate accounts of single attacks or events, but may not report on multiple events or track long-term trends. Therefore, while a single line mention of an attack on an educational building may be sufficient to add to a tally of incident data, it is not enough for reporting quantitative statistics about larger attacks, such as where a mortality or injury toll can change over time.

The EUA methodology also reveals limitations in using field offices to record incident data. There were instances when a UNESCO field office was not aware of an attack or stated outright that no attack had occurred, even after other sources had reported on an incident. To ensure accuracy, EUA used multiple sources to confirm information on attacks.
Finally, several governments implicated in *Education Under Attack 2010* have denigrated the report and its findings, claiming that the media reports that EUA relies on are inaccurate and unreliable, and therefore the findings of the report are false. There are many reasons to suggest the opposite. Long-standing media traditions including internal standards on corroborating information with multiple, independent sources and formalized layers of review and editing, suggest a high degree of reliability, especially of incidents reported by multiple independent media outlets. Indeed, the comparative advantage of media reporting as a method of gathering information about attacks may be that media outlets are to some extent self-vetting. Editorial staffs vet the quality of reported stories in advance of publication. Expecting this, reporters have incentives to do thorough and careful investigations from the outset. And when incidents are picked up by multiple media outlets, cumulative effects of multiple, independent vetting processes further verify the story and incident (so long as stories are independently vetted and not merely reposting data from earlier reports). Thus media reports may be amongst the more accurate methods to gather data on attacks.

### 6.3.2 Education For All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report (GMR)

#### 6.3.2.1 EFA-GMR Methodology

Since 2001 an Education for All partnership led by UNESCO has released annual reports monitoring global progress towards the Education For All (EFA) commitment. These reports measure progress towards all six of the EFA goals: early childhood care and education, universal primary education, youth and adult learning needs, improved adult literacy, quality of education, and gender parity and equality in education. In addition to monitoring progress towards these goals, the annual EFA reports include several chapters based on an annual theme. The theme of the 2011 report was ‘conflict,’ and it concluded that conflict was a major barrier preventing attainment of the EFA goals.

The EFA GMR is presented here as an example of a thorough, resource-intensive type of intergovernmental thematic report. The report’s analysis and discussion of conflict, attacks and education was heavily reliant on secondary sources, extracting data and information from a variety of sources to produce a comprehensive analysis. A 23-member research team assembled by UNESCO staff spent a year in producing the report, using consultation meetings, field missions, extensive document review, interviews, and input from a network of individual experts, advisory board members, UN agencies, NGOs and other institutions. Forty-nine background papers were commissioned from external research experts for the project. Over 500 reference documents were used in the analysis, with statistical research supported by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).

#### 6.3.2.2 EFA GMR Analysis

The EFA Monitoring Report is an example of the kind of thematic reporting possible when considerable resources are aimed towards producing a comprehensive analysis of complex issues (in this case education and conflict). The report has many uses but it is primarily intended for advocacy. It provides substantial evidence of problems, the potential underlying causes of these problems, and prescriptive recommendations for solutions. Its focus is much larger than the EUA report and therefore has much broader advocacy aims and purposes.

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27 Ibid.
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The major limitation with the EFA methodology is that it is extremely resource-intensive. It is only replicable with considerable resources and explicit support of many within the international community. Moreover, it is not a methodology that is efficient or effective for continuous monitoring or surveillance. It is not effective for “real time” humanitarian or emergency education purposes, other than in its policy and strategy recommendations. It is reliant on secondary data, expert analysis and synthesis of information from many sources. It is historical, in that it does not pick up data as events occur. It is worth noting also that much of the data on attacks on education cited in the report comes from the EUA reports described above.

6.4 Security Reports

Several key informants noted that the first line participants to receive information on attacks in any conflict setting are security personnel. In most humanitarian or conflict settings, the intergovernmental agencies and INGOs receive security briefings through a security network. The sources of security information include international NGO (INGO) security staff and the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). INGO security staff are sometimes in daily communication with parties to a conflict and receive information on insecure locations in advance. The information gained by these networks has much potential value for those working on protecting education from attack. Typically, security staff issue regular messages to program staff about security incidents, including attacks on educational facilities.

Currently, aside from the publicly available weekly UNDSS reports, there is not much public information about how the UNDSS gains, stores or disseminates information. What is known is that information is recorded. The cumulative recording of all security incidents within a country could be useful in determining trends and potential motivations of attacks. In theory, the UNDSS or other security systems have the ability to document and record attacks in a timely manner, as security personnel are often amongst the first cadre of actors gain information on attacks. Therefore, if security reports were comprehensively monitored for attacks on education, the information could prove useful for “real time” humanitarian and emergency education purposes, in addition to the recording of incidents for longer term advocacy work. This is a potentially useful information collection mechanism to collect data on attacks on education that could be tapped for monitoring purposes.

6.5 Academic Research

There are myriad types of academic research designs and methodologies. Where one research design may utilize qualitative inquiries, others require advanced population sampling. To review multiple research methodologies here would be unfeasible and unnecessary. As in the study below, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), academic work clearly has the ability to produce data on attacks on education and potentially to provide valuable information to a future global monitoring system.

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6.5.1 Columbia University Program on Forced Migration & Health (CUPFMH) DRC Study

6.5.1.1 CUPFMH Methodology
The Columbia University Program examined grave violations of children’s rights in South Kivu, DRC. The study utilized standard methodology for producing representative and generalizable population-based research. The research team utilized a three-stage cluster sample. Briefly, 20 randomly sampled households in each of 40 randomly sampled non-urban areas in each of South Kivu’s eight territories were interviewed regarding grave violations. The sampling frame was based on the Ministry of Health’s 2009 population estimation. The sample size was calculated assuming that grave violations would be reported in ten percent of households. The sample size was generated to estimate that the real rate of violations would be between 7 and 13 percent (+/- 3%) 95% of the time. The sample was also computed to have 95% confidence, 80% power and to have a design effect of two. The calculated sample size of 768 was rounded up to 800 based on the belief that some clusters would have constraints. The 40 urban areas were sampled proportional to population size. When villages were inaccessible, the nearest accessible village was used. Households were selected using interval sampling.

The survey took place over a five month period. An adult member of each sampled household was asked about four grave violations that members of the household experienced within the preceding six months. In each community, a key informant interview also occurred to gain information from community leaders about the experiences of the entire community. Four national researchers—two men and two women—conducted the interviews. All were university educated, living in Bukavu, and fluent in French, Swahili, and other local languages spoken in South Kivu. Each participated in three days of intensive interview training on subjects including data collection, sensitivity, informed consent and discussions of psycho-social topics.

The study found that, each year, 2.9% (95% CI: 1.5 – 4.3, DE: 2.69) of children under 18 are experiencing at least one of the four Resolution 1612 violations measured. This estimate does not include rape and sexual abuse. This means 44,898 children (95% CI: 23,679 – 66,118, DE: 2.90) throughout South Kivu province (excluding the cities of Bukavu and Uvira) experienced one of the four grave violations (recruitment, abduction, killing or maiming, attacks against education or hospitals) in the first 6.5 months of 2010. These numbers are more than 20 times higher than UN reports, including the MRM.

6.5.1.2 CUPFMH – Analysis
There are limitations with this research. It required a reasonably accurate original sampling frame, which was provided by the Ministry of Health. In many areas without an accurate sampling frame of community populations or households or areas experiencing displacement, different sampling methods are necessary. Interviewees may not tell the truth, especially concerning sensitive subjects. People may not have revealed the true extent of their experiences or may have exaggerated problems for a variety of reasons. Asking a single household member about the experiences of other members could lead to under-reporting.

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30 Including sensitive subjects such as violence and rape could result in inaccurate reporting due to bias and fear. Hence they were omitted from the survey.
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There were five clusters that were inaccessible due to insecurity and other reasons. It is reasonable to assume that these clusters experience violations at a higher rate than the other 88% of the sample. Therefore the findings represent a potential minimum estimate. Seventeen percent of households were skipped because no adult was present. This may have also affected the results.

The research design took note of ethical concerns. Confidentiality had to be preserved to protect both respondents and researchers from adverse consequences of participation. Interviews required informed consent, took place in private and interviewees were told they could cease the interview at any time. Only individuals over the age of eighteen participated. It was essential that interviewees could be referred to health and social services if deemed needed. Some villages and households were re-visited in order to determine whether negative incidents had occurred as a result of participation.

The methodology used by the research team is standard methodology for conducting population-based research. Representative population-based sampling is the methodology necessary to produce an overall rate of incidence of attacks on education and prevalence of impacts. Other methods require information on attacks to be reported or verified passively. This method actively gains a rate of incidence that is generalizable to an entire population by seeking information from members of the population. Academic research such as this study is amongst the most effective methods for gaining a statistically sound “true” estimate of overall incidence. Population-based sampling is also a useful methodology for evaluation research. It is a type of research that could be employed to understand the effectiveness of programmatic responses to attacks on education or otherwise, and is necessary for truly understanding what has occurred in an area and the effects of any programmatic responses. But this research takes time and resources to produce, and would not be particularly effective for informing early warning or rapid response.

6.6 Centralized Databases

Many organizations compile data on attacks on education or related attacks through a centralized database or repository. This is especially common amongst organizations monitoring attacks on the higher education sector. While some organizations use internet-based shared document management systems, such as Google docs, for data storage and management, others use traditional databases that are either entirely localized or web-accessible. The majority of the organizations that use a centralized database for managing information collect data for one of two purposes (or both): allegations of attacks on particular individuals or “case data”, primarily for use in delivery of direct services to victims, and details of alleged attacks/patterns of attacks or “incident reports”, primarily for use in advocacy including alert-writing, lobbying and reporting. This section provides examples of each.

6.6.1 Scholars at Risk Network (SAR) and IIE Scholar Rescue Fund (SRF) Case Databases

6.6.1.1 SAR/SRF Case Database Methodologies

Both the Scholars at Risk Network (SAR) and the Institute of International Education’s Scholar Rescue Fund maintain case databases for purposes of evaluating and providing direct assistance to endangered scholars.\textsuperscript{31} Although the structure, coding and specific content of the databases differ, both seek as

\textsuperscript{31} The Scholars at Risk case database is actual one section of a larger integrated database that also includes incident data used for advocacy. Similar databases are kept by other organizations doing similar work, notably the Council for Assisting Academic Refugees (CARA).
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detailed information as possible about allegations of threats or attacks, including dates, locations, perpetrators and motives, victims and impacts. Both also seek and record information about the type and details of the help requested, including timing, duration and suitable locations. Both seek to develop background information on the individual experiencing an alleged attack, including CVs, letters of reference, a personal statement, lists and examples of academic work and publications, etc.

Both also seek to develop secondary data about the socio-political dynamics of the individual complainant’s region, country, local community and academic area (although secondary and background information generally is not recorded in the database itself, but in backup electronic and paper files). Data sources include victims of alleged attacks, third-party nominators familiar with the alleged attacks (including family, friends, professional colleges, journalists, human rights defenders, diplomatic and government sources, among others), organizational affiliates and members, and published and unpublished secondary sources including intergovernmental, government, media and human rights reports.

6.6.1.2 SAR/SRF Case Database Analysis
Case databases represent a potentially significant source of data for any future monitoring system. They offer several advantages, not least their relatively wide coverage. The SAR and SRF databases include alleged attacks on scholars from over 100 countries and many, if not most, academic disciplines. They have built-in vetting: because SAR and SRF provide relatively high-cost, limited-availability services, they are heavily incentivized to evaluate information closely to ensure that the most deserving candidates are prioritized.

These case databases are both static and active, both receiving unsolicited applications for assistance and conducting affirmative (although generally discrete or confidential) outreach for new cases in need of support. And because they are designed for the purpose of delivering direct services, they can capture information in or near real-time. Given this, especially in combination with the fact that many attacks on higher education are targeted at specific content or persons and therefore potential indicators of future, wider crackdowns, case databases like those of SAR and SRF may contribute to early-warning and related mitigation or prevent responses that a global monitoring system might trigger.

Case databases also have several limitations. Because they are designed for immediate delivery of services, the information is generally not heavily coded. Details are often stored textually in notes and comments, and those fields and codes that are used to organize data vary from organization to organization. This would make it difficult for organizations to contribute existing data to reports or other monitoring easily and without investing significant staff time. In addition, case databases are not representative or comprehensive samples of all victims of attacks, not even within the sub-populations served by the organization (that is “scholars” in the case of SAR and SRF, “journalists” in the case of IFEX, “writers” in the case of PEN). Combined with coding problems, this means these databases may not be suitable for broad, quantitative analysis, at least not without qualifying statements.

These practical considerations aside, ethical concerns may limit the ability of organizations using case databases to contribute significant information to global monitoring. Security of applicants and clients selected for assistance is of paramount importance to organizations collecting case data. Where release of data could potentially result in negative consequences to individuals, such as victims of on-going threats still in their home countries or victims who have fled threats but whose family members or colleagues may be vulnerable to retaliation by proxy, organizations may be reluctant to share
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information with persons or groups outside of their direct control, at least absent clear guarantees. This is particularly true for groups like SAR and SRF who work on the higher education sector where the content of a scholar’s work (and therefore the identity) is often essential to understanding and reporting on the cause and details of an attack.

Beyond security, confidentiality and consent are related ethical concerns which may limit the use of case databases for monitoring. SAR and SRF receive information from victims of attacks for a specific purpose: to evaluate for possible selection for direct assistance. Both organizations and those like them rely on victims’ trust that confidential, potentially harmful information will not be shared unnecessarily. If even a negligible security risk might result from well-structured sharing of information for monitoring purposes, this might be considered unnecessary in relation to the purpose of delivering help to the individual, and therefore improper. Seeking formal, written consent to data sharing, such disclaimers on application materials and on websites, could help but would raise additional ethical questions about whether consent is volitional when sought from an individual seeking immediate relief from urgent, often life-threatening circumstances.

6.6.2 NEAR/Education International Incident Databases

6.6.2.1 NEAR/EI Incident Database Methodology
Both the Network for Education and Academic Rights (NEAR) and Education International (EI) maintain incident data for purposes of capturing details of alleged attacks or patterns of attacks on education, primarily for use in advocacy and lobbying. Although the structure, coding and specific content of these databases differ, both seek as detailed information as possible about alleged incidents. Both NEAR and EI receive information about the attacks from affiliated members within their respective networks. Both also seek to develop secondary data about the situations in different countries, including from intergovernmental, government, media and human rights reports. NEAR generally receives information in the form of alerts from human rights or higher education organizations or identifies situations of concern from media and develops further information itself from persons directly involved, including family and advocates for victims. NEAR processes the information received into “action” and “information” alerts which it then circulates through its own listserv and website. Action alerts request recipients to take a recommended action, generally letter-writing or lobbying, while information alerts provide updates on earlier alerts.

EI uses incident information in a variety of ways, including assisting affiliated academic unions in bringing information and complaints to the UN system (including the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and the Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART)). EI has developed its own report – the EI Barometer—that reports on the quality of education and respect for human and labor rights in countries around the world, including academic freedom, gender equality, students with special needs, refugee and minority children, and child labor. In the past, EI headquarters staff developed the content of the Barometer largely from secondary sources, including statistics from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics and ILO, UNDP, human rights (Amnesty and HRW), Education for All (EFA) and other reports. At various times consultants and EI regional offices and members have also contributed to the content of the Barometer. The Barometer is publically accessible online on the EI website.32

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6.6.2.2 NEAR/EI Incident Database Analysis

Incident databases and case databases differ primarily in their intended purpose. Incident databases may lack many of the candidate-focused fields or personal information that are necessary for delivery of direct assistance, as these are less important to the advocacy purposes of the incident database. As a result, ethical concerns of security, confidentiality and consent, although still important, may be more easily resolved with incident databases. This is especially true for those incident databases, like the EI Barometer, which depend heavily on publicly available information. Incident databases therefore represent another potentially significant source of data for any future monitoring system. However, the reliance on secondary sources may also undermine the value the information provided, especially if the secondary sources themselves are already partners in a monitoring system.

Incident databases may or may not be as timely as case databases, depending on the nature of the advocacy they aim to achieve. The EI Barometer, for example, which aims to support lobbying and policy changes (among other goals) may be less timely than NEAR’s database which aims to trigger urgent action on behalf of endangered scholars in real time.

Incident databases have relatively wide coverage, but also like case databases they are not representative or comprehensive samples of all attacks, and therefore may not be suitable for broad, quantitative analysis. Built-in vetting may lack the same direct assistance dimension of case databases, and in the case of databases supporting urgent action alerts there may be pressure to reduce vetting time. But in general incident databases benefit from internal incentives to maintain accuracy and quality, as these reflect on the organization’s reputation. This is especially true in the case of databases like NEAR and EI which are compiled and maintained directly by headquarters staff.

6.7 International NGO (INGO) Thematic Reports

Though placed under a single heading here, the research of international NGOs is highly variable. There is no single methodology used by NGOs, and even within an NGO, research methodology can vary depending on the report. Different NGOs may be working within different spheres (e.g. humanitarian, human rights or education) with entirely different purposes for reporting research, such as advocacy, accountability or capacity-building. International NGOs may issue reports focused exclusively on attacks on education or may include attacks on education as part of a larger subject. They have been grouped together here because they often provide an example for monitoring of attacks using what can be described as case-study research. International NGOs do not typically conduct surveillance of an issue over extended periods of time or in multiple countries or contexts. What international NGOs typically produce are discrete reports that provide information on attacks on education during a determinate time period and location. This approach provides what might be called “snapshot” data. Here we provide three examples of such data collection by international NGOs to research attacks on education.

6.7.1 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Reports

6.7.1.1 HRW Methodology

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has released several reports focused on attacks on education as human rights violations.33 These reports provide an example of both typical human rights research

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33 See Human Rights Watch, Targets of Both Sides: Violence against Students, Teachers, and Schools in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces, (New York: HRW, 2010), Human Rights Watch, Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on
methodology and “snapshot” investigations that produce evidence on a situation in a given location, time period and context. Field investigations are at the heart of HRW research and these investigations are primarily focused on in-depth interviews with victims and witnesses to attacks.

HRW researchers have considerable expertise in their respective thematic or regional foci. In reporting on attacks on education, HRW has relied on the expertise of researchers with years of experience in promoting children’s rights. These experts rely on networks of local contacts, including local human rights NGOs, lawyers, civil society members and government officials, to inform their research. These networks are used to provide information and, most importantly, to help identify witnesses and victims for interviews.

Extensive background research is used to become familiar with the local political, social and cultural context of the environment where attacks on education are occurring. Communication with local networks is the primary method for gaining local context. Media reports can also be used to identify attacks that deserve further research.

Field research occurs mainly in the regions and specific locations where attacks on education have occurred and is focused on in-depth, qualitative interviews with victims and witnesses. The purpose of interviews is not only to gain an understanding of the reality of what has occurred but to allow victims and witnesses to express their personal feelings, hardships and concerns. Victim opinions can also act to inform recommendations that are made to seek redress for attacks. In addition to victims and witnesses, researchers interview many others with direct knowledge of attacks including local education and civil society leaders, rights activists and military personnel. HRW also makes attempts to interview alleged perpetrators, although requests for interviews are rarely accepted.

Interview methodology varies for every interview, but there are several goals of interviews that are consistent throughout HRW research: to ascertain the truth, to corroborate the veracity of statements, to protect the security and dignity of witnesses and to remain impartial. One-on-one interviews provide privacy, which helps in building confidence and gathering more complete information. Privacy also helps in ascertaining the truth, as multiple interviewees are independently asked about the same incident, allowing for cross verification of statements. Anonymity is used to add to privacy and to ensure security after interviews. Researchers also make efforts to ensure that interviewees are emotionally and psychologically able to be interviewed and will take efforts to refer interviewees to any available services.

Finally, the data and information gained during HRW field research is synthesized into a publicly-released report. Raw data from HRW research is typically in notebook form. It must be analyzed and placed into the context of the larger report before being released. Researchers focus the data and information in reports to have the greatest potential impact towards achieving any final recommendations.

6.7.1.2 HRW Analysis

Teachers and Schools in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province, (New York: HRW, 2010) and Human Rights Watch, Sabotaged Schooling: Naxalite Attacks and Police Occupation of Schools in India’s Bihar and Jharkhand States (New York: HRW, 2009)

34 See HRW Methodology Website: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75141.
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An essential component of HRW research is that it is designed with its advocacy purpose and strategy in mind. The aim is not only to expose rights violations but to advocate effectively for recommendations designed to provide accountability and redress. The reports focused on attacks on education have been conducted in countries such as Pakistan, Thailand and India not only because of the incidence of attacks there but also because of the international and domestic advocacy options available when working on these countries.

Data collected by HRW on attacks on education are not designed to be used for other purposes. It is rich, qualitative data that is especially effective for advocacy. It is not designed to provide quantitative incident rates, to allow for generalizations to additional populations or to prove statistical causation or correlation. For example, informants stated that data could not be used academically and that even if quantified, there is not enough incident data to have statistical power.

HRW research methodology is useful for understanding the details of an attack and the personal impacts felt by victims. It can effectively describe victims and gain contextual information including opinions on motives. It can be also potentially be used to generate estimates of the numbers of victims of a given attack, and describe the targets or scope of an attack. Gaining information on perpetrators and motives varies greatly depending on the situation. In Balochistan, for instance, the perpetrators and motives for most attacks were identified because they publically claimed responsibility. Attacks are not attributed to perpetrators unless the evidence is clear. The HRW methodology is not effective for tracking incidence or prevalence of attacks over time. It is not timely in the sense that the data in HRW reports is generally historical and therefore cannot be used to collect early warning surveillance data.\(^{35}\)

There are again ethical concerns. Of primary concern is the safety and security of interviewees. Confidentiality is essential in this realm of research and names are frequently changed to pseudonyms or left anonymous in HRW reports. The security of HRW researchers is also a concern, and researchers may go unacknowledged in a report if warranted.

6.7.2 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict Reports

6.7.2.1 Watchlist Methodology
Watchlist produces country-level reports describing the situations of children and armed conflict in specific countries, including relevant information about attacks on education.\(^{36}\) Country reports document individual violations against children but also attempt to provide trend data. They may also document a country’s political and legal efforts to prevent violations, if applicable.

The Watchlist reports generally have been developed by compiling secondary data. In a 2006 report on the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, information on education was pulled from previous reports by UNICEF, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and an interagency UN assessment mission,\(^{37}\) and specific incidents of attacks on education were extracted from research by Project GRAM-Kivu, the Small Arms Survey, and Amnesty International.\(^{38}\) Similarly, a

\(^{35}\) Typically, HRW reports are issued after events occur. However, HRW researchers are often documenting violations in real-time as emergencies and conflicts are occurring. This research could in theory be used to inform humanitarian programmatic responses.

\(^{36}\) Attacks on education as they relate to children under the age of 18 (i.e. primary and secondary education).


\(^{38}\) Ibid.
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2008 report on Sri Lanka cites information on attacks on education from reports by organizations including Amnesty International, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, and the OSRS/CAAC.39 Watchlist is currently piloting its first primary data collection project in the Central African Republic (CAR). It aims to release an April 2011 report documenting violations against children during armed conflict there.

6.7.2.2 Watchlist Analysis
Watchlist produces country reports for advocacy purposes. The reports are intended to inform UN members, including the Security Council, national governments and local authorities, and to provide prescriptive recommendations for improving the protection of children. The methodology used is appropriate for these purposes. The compilation of secondary data can provide an overview of human rights violations of children in conflict affected countries, and there is additional value in Watchlist’s analyzing UN and national government policy actions that have been taken towards preventing attacks. However, the reliance on secondary data on attacks, especially attacks on education, means that the quality of reporting is dependent on others and will only be as good as the reporting of the groups publishing the original sources. Moreover, the reports do not provide any new descriptive or qualitative information describing the impacts of attacks, and cannot accurately represent incidence or prevalence rates of attack necessary to inform humanitarian or emergency education work and timely surveillance.

6.7.3 CARE Report on Afghanistan

6.7.3.1 CARE Methodology
CARE issued a report, Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, in 2009. The purpose of the study was to determine the nature of threats and attacks on primary and secondary education in Afghanistan and to “offer recommendations for improving the ability of stakeholders to mitigate and wherever possible prevent, future attacks.” The research consisted of three main parts: a literature review of relevant secondary sources, including an analysis of the Ministry of Education and UNICEF databases on school attacks; interviews with key stakeholders within the education sector; and a field study. A total of 1,037 individual and groups interviews, as well as 559 focus groups, including meetings with key stakeholders including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, UNICEF and aid agencies involved in the education sector including CARE, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Swedish Committee, Aga Khan Development Network and Save the Children UK, parents, police officers, school principals, members of local shuras (community councils), teachers at different levels, and students. A total of 4,819 people were involved in the field exercise.

Several limitations were experienced during the data collection. The first limitation was insecurity and limited access to some areas where attacks were known to take place. Next, the UNICEF and Ministry of Education database formats used to analyze the dynamics of attacks did not match exactly. Under-reporting, misreporting and partial information on attacks limited the comprehensiveness of reporting on attacks on education in Afghanistan.

The report cites incidence of attacks in the country according to the Ministry of Education. It describes some of the motivations of attacks, including the symbolic value, association with international military forces, local conflicts, and criminal opportunism. It also describes some of the short and long-term impacts of attacks. Informants to this study most often cited as helpful or illuminating the section of the

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CARE report describing prevention and mitigation mechanisms, which they felt may provide useful examples for future efforts to prevent or reduce attacks in other areas of Afghanistan. The report also provides specific recommendations for all levels—community, district and central—to improve protection of education.

6.7.3.2 CARE Analysis
Many informants considered the CARE report a worthwhile study which provides critical insights into types of attacks, the motivations for attacks, and ways attacks might be mitigated or prevented. As such it provides practitioners with valuable guidance on how to advance their protection work. For example, the indicators used to analyze schools at risk have been used in planning future school sites as well as developing protection mechanisms to make existing schools safer.

Limitations include that the report only provides a snapshot of the situation in a part of Afghanistan. To remain current it would have to be repeated on a regular basis. But obtaining such in-depth information takes considerable investment of time and resources, which may make regular repetition difficult. Moreover experienced researchers are needed as well as a rigorous sampling methodology. Insecurity within the country was a major limiting factor to the analysis and the research team had to in some cases rely on unsupervised locally hired staff to carry out the surveys. Finally, while the report provides significant insights about the situation in Afghanistan, its findings may not be generalizable to other contexts, and even greater resources would be required to replicate this approach elsewhere or to scale it up to report on a wider group of countries.

6.8 International NGO (INGO) Global Reports
International NGOs often issue annual or semi-annual global reports that provide global overviews of a particular issue. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch each issue annual global reports that review the state of human rights in the world, with chapters organized by country, region, or thematic issue. The purpose and methodology of these reports differs from the single, discrete reports described above, as they aim to provide an overview of a situation with aggregate sums of incidence data featured prominently. INGOs have not produced a global report on attacks on education. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Global Report provides an example of a global report on a closely-related subject.

6.8.1 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Global Report

6.8.1.1 Coalition Methodology
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has produced three global reports in the last decade (2001, 2004 and 2008) for the original purpose of increasing awareness of the problem of child soldiers. The 2008 report attempted to produce detailed information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in 197 countries between April 2004 and October 2007. The report required a year to produce by a single manager, a team of staff members conducting research, writing and editing, and many “expert” consultants hired to conduct research on specific countries. The resources required to produce the Report were said to have been vastly underestimated and its production required unmeasured, unpaid and overtime work from Coalition staff.

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The bulk of the Coalition report is produced using desk research and extracting secondary data, especially on legislation, from sources including UN and NGO reports. Consultants produce additional country-level field work, developing local sources of information beyond what can be gleaned from published reports. These sources generally include local media and “confidential” informants. Countries with known and consistent child soldier recruitment are monitored “somewhat consistently.” Other sources of information include governments, academic sources, human rights and humanitarian organizations, journalists, lawyers and activists. Though Coalition members did provide some information, they were not cited as strong sources of data. Most local partners and Coalition members did not have data and were not trained to collect it. Therefore, the Coalition needed to train internal staff to gather information.

6.8.1.2 Coalition Analysis

The Coalition reports are generally well received and provide a resource that is not available elsewhere. The reports’ statistics and conclusions about trends have been cited regularly by NGOs and UN agencies. An internal Coalition evaluation determined that the reports were of very high quality and achieved their objectives in terms of content. Because of the reliance on secondary data, however, much of the information in the Coalition reports is available from other sources. One valuable addition of the reports is that they track information on child soldiers that is missed by the MRM. Informants asserted that the MRM’s particular focus does not gather “anywhere close” to the numbers of places and aggregate sums of children that are unlawfully recruited, and that the Coalition reports helped address this gap.

Some question the global coverage of the Coalition reports. Many informants who use the 2008 Report stated that they do not refer to entries on countries where there is no recruitment or use of child soldiers. At the same time, during local launches of reports, local partners consistently expressed interest in the local data and analysis. There have been no additional calls for more rigorous, quantitative research or data. The reports provide a baseline estimate and do not provide a quantitative scope of the problem. In fact, informants stated that given the Coalition’s resources, they cannot provide “anywhere near a scientific estimate” of the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

Informants stated that there were significant problems with the reliance on consultants to produce country-level research. One of these has been the variable quality of the writing. This required additional time and resources put into training and editing. Despite additional frameworks and training, the quality of what consultants produced was highly variable. If an additional report was produced, the Coalition would likely hire consultants to research and provide information but would hire Coalition staff to draft the findings.

There is a sense that producing the report more regularly than the current four-year interval would enhance its usefulness. However, informants stated that producing the reports absorbs enormous resources and time. Currently, the Coalition loses institutional knowledge during the time gaps and must renew knowledge building every three to four years. The problematic consultancies required additional editorial resources. The value of how these resources have been used is being questioned.

Key informants also cited the identification of trends as the component of the global reports that had the least amount of impact for Coalition partners. While these reports could identify problems, they were largely unable to offer sufficient solutions to these problems. Many stakeholders suggested that they required more information on what to do in local contexts for specific situations. The global prescriptions for preventing the use of child soldiers were therefore found to be insufficient at the local level. Informants believed that understanding the cultural, political, and societal reasons for the
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phenomenon would have been more important for advocacy and programmatic work. In either case, gaining the information required to understand the reasons for the use of child soldiers would require resource-intensive research in difficult and potentially dangerous environments. This would be true likewise in seeking to understand the reasons and motives behind attacks on education. The technical and legal issues behind prohibition, criminalization, training, accountability and oversight can be understood through researching policies and legislation, but the socio-economic and cultural factors that support the use of child soldiers, or attacks on education, and the methods to influence the cultural environment are more difficult to ascertain.

When the first global report was released, the goal of the report was to inform and advocate on child soldiers as a major issue that needed attention. With the creation and implementation of the MRM, the goals of more recent reports are less defined. The reports do provide information on many countries not included in the MRM, but without the advocacy goals of pursuing a UN Resolution, treaty or monitoring mechanism, resources may be better put to use on other concerns. The Coalition has determined that they will not be producing an additional global report in the near future and instead will produce its next report on government responses in approximately twenty targeted countries. The changing direction of the Coalition’s research away from global reports suggests that more targeted research on problem areas and situations may be more efficient and effective at this point in time. The Coalition is planning to put more resources into research that fuels advocacy rather awareness-building or the production of information per se.

6.9 Local Civil Society Data

Local civil society members are essential participants in the monitoring of attacks on education. In addition to programmatic work, local civil society monitoring can feed into the MRM, the Education Cluster or other potential mechanisms and programs. It is not feasible to describe a single methodology being used by local civil society organizations. These organizations are not unified, internationally or domestically, and therefore do not utilize a standard methodology for collecting information on attacks on education. In certain countries, UNESCO is working with local civil society on standards, indicators, forms and methods for reporting to both the MRM and the Education Cluster. However, the methods that each local organization uses to collect information are entirely context-specific. This section presents two examples of organizations in occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) that monitor attacks on education.

6.9.1 Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies and the Right to Education Campaign at Birzeit University

6.9.1.1 Ramallah/Birzeit Methodologies

The Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies (the “Center”) and Right to Education Campaign at Birzeit University (the “Campaign”) collect information about attacks on education through networks of contacts. In the case of the Campaign, information is limited to arrests of higher education students. The Campaign typically gains initial information about the arrests from other students, then uses the student’s ID number to track the student, speak to the family and follow the case. Cases are stored in a database, including information on arrest date, where it took place, the status of the case, and whether there is any reported mistreatment. Students who are arrested are also sometimes surveyed after their release about the conditions of their detention. The Ramallah Center is concerned more generally with violations of academic freedom at the university level, including dismissals, arrests on campus, and the
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prevention of student movement. The Center makes effort to interview all parties to a violation and documents findings in published reports.

6.9.1.2 Ramallah/Birzeit Analysis
Neither of these organizations actively seek out new cases. Their methodology depends on having reliable informants. It is therefore difficult to determine the percentage of all cases about which information is gained. The Campaign limits itself to collecting information on student arrests, and therefore has a high degree of confidence that it is able to track close to 100% of all cases. It has apparently become part of the campus culture to inform the Campaign about arrests, and they often hear about a single case from multiple students. But while the most visible and defined cases are easy to track, many other types of attacks are more difficult to monitor. Limitations on movement, for example, such as cases of foreign professors being denied visas to teach at Palestinian Universities or students from Gaza being denied permits to study in the West Bank, are more difficult to define, and therefore are less suited to the types of incident reporting and tracking most often employed by both the Campaign and Center. (Restrictions that occur repeatedly or are experienced for an extended time may be better suited to surveying or other methodologies.)

Both the Campaign and the Center are fairly “light” organizations with few staff members to coordinate. While this may positively increase their ability to react and collect case-based information rapidly, the small size of many local civil society groups, limited opportunities for professional training and generally heavy reliance on local informants all contribute to concerns about reliability of data and verification. In the case of the Center, for example, although they will not intervene directly in a case without first vetting the information, usually through first-hand interviews, their annual reports may include information on all cases received, even if they are unable to verify the full details.

Security is also a major concern of local civil society groups in the oPt and elsewhere. Indeed globally, many informants claimed that security is the most pressing issue for local civil society organizations engaged in monitoring or responding to attacks on education. Informants discussing Pakistan, for instance, stated that there are no local organizations systematically compiling data on attacks because of fear. Local activists and civil society members everywhere are at risk for retaliatory attacks or other repercussions of recording and sharing information. Therefore, local civil society data on attacks may be especially limited in regions of active conflict, instability or limited rule of law.
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7. TRENDS IDENTIFIED IN THE INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS

It is clear from the interviews and analysis that there are a substantial numbers of stakeholders, including intergovernmental, governmental, human rights, education and civil society actors who are actively attempting to devise more effective and robust responses to attacks on education at all levels, including efforts aimed at mitigating or prevent future attacks. Moreover, most stakeholders strongly agree with the starting point of this feasibility study, that definitional and data gaps make developing responses to attacks—particularly broad, cross-board or cross-sectoral responses—especially challenging. They therefore in principle strongly support the study’s attempt to address these gaps by devising recommendations for improved data production, compilation and use. Despite this support in principle, however, there are significant questions about what a global monitoring system might look like and what it might deliver in practical terms, especially for victims of attacks and their advocates on the ground. The analysis reveals a wariness of gathering data for its own sake or for the purposes of producing another, expensive report, and a strong feeling that any system which would in part be asking participants to contribute information—with attendant costs in time, resources and often personal risk—must produce concrete, positive outcomes for local actors. In response to a researcher’s question of what local actors would think a suitable target outcome of a global monitoring system might look like, one informant summed this general feeling up: “Make the attacks to stop.”

The stakeholder and data collection analysis reveals significant gaps in current monitoring. In other words, the “map” of current efforts reveals more “islands” than broad, continental expanses of activity. Many of these islands are already linked; many organizations included in the mapping are already in regular contact with each other, and in many cases actively partnering on responses to specific attacks. This raises the question of how a global monitoring system might increase and/or strengthen these links; that is, how a global system might build bridges between existing islands of current monitoring activity.

Informants’ viewpoints are summarized below.

**Strong interest in improved monitoring and reporting of attacks on education**
- Many respondents expressed their concern and expressed interest in improved monitoring and reporting, as a tool towards improved prevention and response.

**No Desire to Reinvent the Wheel**
- There is little appetite for creating a new UN monitoring mechanism for education under attack. Rather, there is a strong preference for improvement of the current one (MRM).
- Reinventing the wheel is less of a concern at the higher education level as these concerns are not covered by the MRM, within the Education Cluster, or another global system. Even so, higher education expert-practitioners recommend building on existing efforts by creating stronger incentives for:
  - first-hand, local and national actors to report attacks
  - coordination among global monitors in processing information, circulating calls for action, and triggering more effective responses
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Definitional challenges must be addressed

- Clarity on what constitutes an attack on education is fundamental to the success of future collaborative endeavors.
- The current MRM definition of an attack on education is quite narrowly focused. Nonetheless, field based monitoring agencies have found inconsistencies on what constitutes an MRM defined attack within and across their country operations. Expanding the definition beyond the MRM could present further challenges.
- Besides violent physical attacks on individuals and institutions, there is concern about attacks involving coercive, implied or threatened use of force to impair academic content and conduct. At higher education level in some countries, such attacks may occur more frequently than overt violent physical attacks. They are also more difficult to record, monitor and respond to.
- “Buy-in” amongst key stakeholders on a working definition is perceived to be essential. It may be expedient to begin with a broad working definition of attacks on education and, within this broad definition, prioritize, at least initially, the most violent, widespread or egregious attacks in future surveillance efforts.

Different Actors Have Different Information Needs

- The most repeated sentiments regarding a potential global monitoring system is that it must be designed to produce needed and valuable information.
- Different actors have different data needs. For example:
  - **MRM**
    - Currently, the Security Council requires “UN verified” data which limits investigations of grave violations to designated mostly UN staff. MRM field operations must record violations “incident by incident” and require site visits and/or interviews with several informants. Triangulation is also highly desirable in building a case against perpetrators of grave violations.
    - How information flows to the MRM varies by context and country. Typically, initial reports of an incident come from local civil society or government leaders and are reported directly to MRM task force members or UNESCO or Education Cluster offices. Some country taskforces meet to review the details of every reported case, while others have decentralized the process and require field based staff to verify information they submit to the taskforce.
  - **Humanitarian/Operational Response**
    - Humanitarian agencies often respond to attacks on education by providing safe spaces and emergency education for displaced students, school rehabilitation, and/or advocacy with conflict actors for future safety of schools. For these actors, knowledge that an attack has occurred is sufficient for them to focus their intervention on that school or area. This knowledge may be gained without specific “monitoring” because there is a general conflict or emergency situation and, through security offices or through their general presence, field actors are largely aware of what is occurring in the region.
    - Humanitarian practitioners want information on “why” attacks occur and “which” responses work in preventing or protecting education from attack. This would require rigorous research that evaluates strategies aimed at protecting education from attack or responses to attacks. Research methodologies that
would be used to evaluate humanitarian interventions (such as population-based surveys) could also be used to evaluate existing monitoring programs in the study location.

- **Community Response**
  - Several experts/practitioners stated that communities are aware of the attacks that affect them and therefore do not need monitoring data to take action. Like humanitarian actors, useful research for community responses will provide evidence of best practices at the community level.
  - At the same time, there are rights violations that members of the affected population are likely to know more about than “outside actors,” such as UN monitors or humanitarian agencies\(^\text{42}\), including, for instance:
    - the number of threats and attacks that occur in their communities
    - nature and timing of the threats they confront
    - mindset and habits of those who threaten them
    - resources within the community
    - history of previous threats and coping mechanisms
    - practical possibilities for resisting threats
    - optimal linkage between community and agency responses
  - Technology—SMS text messaging, camera-video, Facebook, among others—have been employed in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America to enable community actors to report human rights violations to national and international actors. The effectiveness and security risks of these endeavors have not been well documented.

- **Global Advocacy**
  - Incident and incidence data was identified as a key requirement for global advocacy purposes. It would enable evidence based reporting on the scale and severity of attacks on education within and across contexts and countries.
  - Current global advocacy relies heavily on global level research and secondary source materials. Creating greater incentives and opportunities for local and national actors to report on attacks could strengthen advocacy efforts moving forward.
  - An annual report, such as *Education under Attack 2010*, is seen as a useful global advocacy tool. Such reports need to be timely, with current data coming from a neutral entity.
  - Information for advocacy at the highest level of government donors is deemed to be essential to ensure education becomes a priority in emergency, transition and fragile contexts. Evidence on program response effectiveness (evaluation) is important at this level as well.

- **Accountability and tribunals**
  - A global monitoring system could potentially generate data that could be used in legal cases against perpetrators of attack. Moreover, it could promote collection and dissemination of data regarding specific incidents that will encourage legal investigations.

- **Academic Use**

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\(^{42}\) As noted earlier, Columbia University’s research in the DRC found that the communities reported attacks on education at a rate that was twenty times higher than MRM reports.
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- Several university-based experts noted that monitoring information can be used by scholars to provide contextual information for conflict and post-conflict studies. For example, data produced by a monitoring system can provide valuable background information to improve understanding of the sociological experiences of communities or contextual information for understanding any community or education response to attacks.

There is a Need to Agree on Standard Indicators

Experts-practitioners’ consensus is that an incremental approach should be taken regarding what is monitored and how to do so. A “first phase” system could begin with a limited set of indicators, leaving room for future expansion. The most violent, widespread and egregious attacks may lend themselves more easily to indicator-based monitoring.

- It is difficult to collect data on the perpetrators of attacks and many experts/practitioners suggested that development of indicators to do so is not a priority at this time. Considerable work is still required to establish attacks on education as a world-wide concern and to develop a committed community of practice to respond to this concern. Moreover, incident evidence can demonstrate intentional targeting even if perpetrator data is not available.
- Many experts-practitioners further advised against attempting to collect data on motives for attacks. While such information would be useful, it is a difficult and subjective concept that works against monitoring consistency. There are, nonetheless, indicators about incidents that may enable a better understanding of potential motives and perpetrators of attacks.

Buy-In for Collaboration Needs to be Secured

- Experts/practitioners currently involved in monitoring are in favor of more active collaboration as a means of responding to or preventing attacks on education. They also identified obstacles to moving forward together, including:
  o confidentiality or other restrictions could undermine data sharing
  o financial costs may be too high to processing data into common monitoring formats
  o competition and need for single agency visibility may erode a collective approach
  o an organization’s need to strengthen their own monitoring capacity may be a higher priority (and faster) than interagency collaboration or progress
- The uses of data must be fully understood before organizations will commit to feeding information into a common monitoring system, whether a centralized system of data collection or multiple, distinct monitoring pathways. Indeed, clarity on needs, uses and “value added” of a shared database or system is essential for agency ‘buy-in.’ Organizations also must understand how a monitoring system can directly help them fulfill their respective priorities.
- Transparency throughout the development process is deemed to be important. This will require gaining the input of many stakeholders and individuals, acknowledging these contributions and providing information on decision-making during the development process.
- Advocating for government contributions to a future global system is seen as important. However, government involvement is not a prerequisite for moving forward with such a system. Moreover, standard procedures and formats for government reporting on protecting education from attack and on attacks themselves would need to be created and employed across governments, something that may not be feasible at this time.
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There is a Need to Engage a Range of Actors

- Ultimately, the purpose, objectives and scope of a future monitoring system would need to guide the organizational structure and stakeholder roles. Within this context, two issues emerged as important contributors to “success:”
  - careful matching of goals, structures and membership of the proposed global monitoring system
  - multi-stakeholder involvement in its developments.
- The use of incentives should be considered in the design phase. Attention should be paid to local actors, especially those in conflict, fragile or repressed states. Incentives to support local actors to contribute data might include:
  - minimizing the time demands of reporting (especially uncompensated time)
  - taking measures to enhance security and confidentiality
  - maximizing the likelihood of positive local-level impacts resulting from reporting
- Some education experts/practitioners stated that the UN education cluster should formally take the lead on monitoring attacks on education, at least at the primary and secondary levels. The education cluster is a neutral body that interacts with local education actors including national government, local NGOs and grassroots community organizations. Other expert-practitioners thought the UN protection cluster (and specifically the Child Protection Working Group) might be a better lead, as many of its members are familiar with the MRM and other forms of child rights monitoring. It was noted that these clusters may vary in strength and capacity and may not exist in some locations where there are attacks.
- The Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) was deemed to be a key stakeholder in a future monitoring system. The Coalition is both able to include UN agencies, such as UNICEF and UNESCO, and also avoid limitations that would be present if the initiative resided completely under the UN. The ability to engage UN General Assembly members in these concerns was also identified as a likely Coalition strength.

Training will Be Required for Any Initiative

- Consistency of efforts—what is measured, how it is measured, how it is recorded, and how it is used—is essential to an effective monitoring system. Training for actors and stakeholders is therefore essential.
- Such training will need to focus on standardized definitions, coding of entries, indicators and data collection methodology. Ethical concerns would need to be central to these trainings as well.
- A central global database or data repository system for attacks on education would also require rigorous training on both data collection and data input to ensure effectiveness and accuracy, depending on the number of persons and organizations allowed to input data. Limiting the number of input-users or adding a layer of editorial-users (who would require heightened training) may reduce start-up and on-going training needs, but this would need to be balanced against desires for broad-based data collection and buy-in, especially among local actors.

43 The inclusion of many stakeholders throughout the development of this Feasibility Study was noted as a positive step towards this goal.
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Ethical Issues Need to be Addressed

- Security and ethical concerns must be taken into account when considering future systems options. Some concerns identified through this research include:
  - individuals, families and entire communities may be placed at risk when they report on human rights violations
  - use of text messaging and social media in reporting rights violations may further endanger local and national informants
  - informants often do not realize an actual benefit from their reporting because follow-up actions are not taken
  - confidentiality, consent and release of information procedures, and other security safeguards may be institutional barriers to inter-agency data sharing
  - agencies may chose to not report rights violations for fear of reprisals or eviction from a country or territory

- Some operational organizations (in an effort to retain neutrality and ensure humanitarian space) will not participate in monitoring systems that involve information sharing with governments, the UN Security Council, militaries or UN peacekeeping forces.

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44 There are instances when even blatant attacks on international humanitarian office have not been reported because of fears of repercussions.
8. DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR A GLOBAL MONITORING SYSTEM

The feasibility study was designed to consider ways of improving global monitoring of attacks on education, from the maximalist idea put forward at the 2009 seminar of a global monitoring system to less elaborate approaches that would enhance the global coverage and the effectiveness of existing systems. In this section, the concept of a global monitoring system is reviewed, drawing on concepts from the health sector and adapting them in the context of attacks on education.

8.1 What is a Global Monitoring System?

In engaging in conversations with relevant stakeholders, it became clear that different individuals had different ideas about what a global monitoring system might include. An important step in this feasibility study is thus creating a case definition for such a system. To do so, the team drew on definitions from the public health discipline. Existing standards and evaluation protocols for surveillance systems from the Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization were utilized. The research team adapted these standards and definitions that were developed for health information systems to make them relevant for a global monitoring system for attacks on education. The resulting definition is as follows:

A global monitoring system for attacks on education is an integrated set of processes for the routine collection, analysis and interpretation of data used to identify and trigger appropriate responses to such attacks. A functional global monitoring system requires organizational and staff capacity for data collection and analysis. It also requires timely dissemination of information to those who can undertake effective prevention and response activities. Although the core of any system includes the collection, analysis and dissemination of data, the process can be understood only in the context of specific and focused outcomes. In this way, the higher-level function of a global information system can be stated to be to protect education from attacks.

8.2 Key Components

Data are the key components of a global monitoring system. The literature review, key informant interviews and the Mid-Project Consultation of May 2011, allowed the research team to identify the major data required for triggering and improving responses to attacks. These are summarized briefly in the table below. Together, these main types of data represent the information components required by actors in education, humanitarian, political, legal, community and public awareness/advocacy response areas.

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### Table 6. Data Sources and Collection Methodologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Needs</th>
<th>Incident Data on Attacks</th>
<th>Incidence/prevalence data on attacks</th>
<th>Qualitative Information on attacks</th>
<th>Evaluation/Best Practice Evidence</th>
<th>Data on legal/political actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of data</strong></td>
<td>• Quantitative (count) data on attacks including many variables describing attacks, targets, context variables (e.g. school type, polling site, nature of attack, etc.), perpetrators and motives</td>
<td>• Rates of attacks, victims, context variables</td>
<td>• Rich, testimonial information regarding attacks/context and responses</td>
<td>• Comparative data evaluating the effectiveness of responses to attacks on education</td>
<td>• Data on legislation/ratification/adjudication concerning protecting education from attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels</strong></td>
<td>• Community • Country • Regional • Global Levels</td>
<td>• Community • Country Levels</td>
<td>• Community • Country Levels</td>
<td>• Community • Country • Regional • Global Levels</td>
<td>• Country • Regional • Global Levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uses</strong></td>
<td>• Evidence of violations • Information to understand nature of attacks and inform responses/protection.</td>
<td>• Evidence of the overall level of violations • Evidence to measure other monitoring mechanisms/efforts • Identifying areas for intervention.</td>
<td>• Evidence of the impact, motives and perpetrators of attacks • Contextual evidence-information to understand nature of attacks and inform responses/protection • Evidence of best practices of responses</td>
<td>• Best practices to select and improve responses to attacks.</td>
<td>• Improve targeting of advocacy responses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3 Data Collection Methodologies

The five main data types identified can generally be gained by employing, separately or in combination, four main data collection methodologies. These methodologies are:

8.3.1 Primary Incident Data Collection
Primary incident data can be used for any responses that require evidence that attacks have occurred at the local or national level. If data is collected and disseminated in a timely manner, it can be very valuable for rapid responses such as emergency education responses and other humanitarian responses. In addition to providing evidence of attacks, primary research offers contextual information that can allow for greater understanding of the motives and impacts of attacks.

Primary incident data collection requires the collection of data on attacks at the field level. Currently, primary incident data of varying quality and quantity is collected by the MRM, education/protection clusters, security agencies (UNDSS/NGO security networks) and international NGOs. The data collected via this method focuses primarily on variables describing attacks, victims, context variables (e.g. school type, polling site, nature of attack, etc.), perpetrators and motives. Data will typically be quantitative in nature, although some may be qualitative. As with any data collection, there are numerous factors that determine the quantity and quality of data (e.g. accuracy, reliability, consistency, timeliness), including the number of data collectors, training, security, and methodology protocols.

8.3.2 Secondary Data Collection
Secondary data collection is the compilation of information that has been initially, or “primarily”, gained by others. It requires other individuals and actors to gain initial knowledge of attacks and to directly share, or indirectly make available, this knowledge. Secondary data collection includes general desk research that utilizes the surveying of both public and private data sources, such as UN databases, NGO reports, media, or academic studies. Remote interview research with field offices can compile data that
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individual contacts possess. This information need not be published and therefore these remote interviews can produce original research that also could be considered “primary” data. This methodology does not necessarily require field visits, interviews or presence. Secondary data collection can compile information on attacks at the local, national, regional or global levels.

The data collected via secondary research is generally incident and contextual data on attacks. It typically includes quantitative counts of attacks, targets/victims, and contextual information. It is difficult for this method to gather information on motives, perpetrators and impacts, although it can and has been done. Secondary research can also compile political or legal data such as information on legislation/ratification/adjudication concerning protecting education from attack. One aspect of secondary data collection concerns the standardization of indicators, methodologies, and protocols. As with primary incident data collection, or any methodology, the information that enters a potential monitoring system is only valuable if the data quality is high. Secondary data collectors must vet the quality of the information which they are abstracting from primary sources.

This research methodology can be used for any responses that require evidence of attacks including most advocacy responses. Secondary research is not useful for many time-sensitive responses such as most humanitarian responses. Contextual information gained through this method can provide information to design responses as well as best practices for improving responses. If applied consistently and longitudinally, this method may be used to increase knowledge of the phenomenon of attacks over geography and over time.

8.3.3 Population-based Research

Population-based studies generally involve rigorous research methodologies that have been peer reviewed and can ensure a certain level of confidence in the findings. These methodologies usually involve sampling and survey techniques to gain information from a population. These studies can be resource intensive. At the outset, they require a certain level of research design expertise. Data collectors must be adequately trained to properly collect data. Research expertise is also required for data analysis. These studies are best conducted at the local level, though they can be conducted at the national level. Costs and resources increase with the size of the area or population being studied. Additionally, there are many ethical concerns with this type of research. Of greatest concern are the protection of citizens and the inability of researchers to provide immediate support or redress to respondents.

Population-based research can provide the data types that are most lacking from current monitoring efforts, namely prevalence and incidence rates. These rates can provide evidence of the overall level of violations within a community, province or nation and their impact. This can provide advocates, education and humanitarian responders with a better notion of the scope of the problem within an area. Rates, as opposed to pure incident figures, can be compared between regions or nations and can identify geographic areas of greatest concern or need of intervention. Rate data based on geographic locations can also be used as evidence of responsibility or accountability for attacks in specific areas.

Rates can be used as evidence to measure the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms or efforts because they provide a true indication of the overall prevalence of attacks which can be compared to the numbers gained by other monitoring methods. In addition to measuring the efficacy of monitoring, these research methodologies can also be used to measure the effects of response efforts in terms of

47 Possible exceptions might include real-time monitoring of media reports.
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protection, prevention and amelioration of attacks. Comparative effectiveness studies to can help to produce a body of best practice data and help to inform future response efforts. Additionally, population-based research could be measure the impact of attacks which is crucial for advocacy work aimed at political action.

Finally, population-based research methodologies are replicable. Therefore they could be used to repeatedly measure the same indicators in the same areas, thus providing longitudinal, or time-based, evidence.

8.3.4 Qualitative Research

In the context of this feasibility study, qualitative research refers to ethnographic, long-form interviews or testimony-based research aimed at gaining a greater understanding of the context of attacks and responses. Qualitative research can provide rich contextual information and also fills in the gaps left by the primary incident data collection by gaining in-depth opinions and insight. For purposes of a monitoring system, qualitative research has more in common with ethnographic, sociological or human rights based research. The methodology requires field research based on long-form interviews. Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Qualitative contextual analysis typically occurs at the community level.

Qualitative research can be extremely effective for gaining data on the context of attacks, in particular perpetrators, motives and impacts of attacks. Qualitative methods can also be used to gain evidence of best practices for responses to attacks. For example, in the CARE Knowledge on Fire report, interviews with community members were the most effective method for gaining information about which community responses are the most effective for preventing attacks.

8.4 Indicator development

Given the wide range of educational variables and the differing nature and context of attacks, there are many possible indicators. Global monitoring activities will require collaboration of stakeholders to develop shared indicators for common purposes. Indicators noted in the course of the research include:

In addition to indicators, information which enters the system should be gained through a standardized data collection methodology which provides standards for data coding, verification, and ethics, amongst other concerns.

Key indicators for describing the nature of the actual attacks on education may include, for each level/type of education:

- Deaths (students; education/service/protection personnel)
- Injured (students; education/service/protection personnel)
- Child soldier recruitment
- Other abductions (students/education personnel)
- Education buildings destroyed/damaged
- Military or security forces occupation/use of education buildings (part/whole)
- Persons detained/imprisoned (students/education personnel)

48There are many ethical considerations described earlier but confidentiality and the ability to provide rapid follow-up responses for informants are among the foremost.
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- Number of education facilities closed
- Days of forced closure of education facilities
- Recorded threats of the above

Contextual information for individual violent attacks may include:

- Type of target/victims (ethnic/religious group; gender)
- Method of attack (bomb, IED, suicide bomb, arson, shooting, other)
- Types of prior safety measures
- Other facility information (eg. use as polling station; presence of security walls; public/private ownership)
- Perpetrator information (identity/allegiance/motives if known)
- Impact
- Responses

A wider range of indicators would be needed to take account of attacks in the form of job-related persecution especially of teachers and university staff, which can include unjustified imprisonment, loss of career opportunities or dismissal, etc.
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9. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT

The architecture, or organizational structure, of a monitoring system will be essential to its success and must be designed with careful deliberation. It is also important to keep in mind that monitoring or information generation requires several roles which could be played by a single actor or multiple actors. These responsibilities include determining the data needs, methodology/research design, actual data collection, analysis, dissemination, use of data (responders), and funding for the entire system. Pinpointing the appropriate actors for each of these steps through a continued consultation process would be essential to the system’s success.

The following section outlines potential architectures of the organization of a monitoring system. There are clear benefits and challenges with each possibility. There are benefits and challenges with each option. In considering options, and making recommendations, the following core elements of effective systems development have been applied:

- An effective information monitoring system would need to include a diverse set of components that are organized around a common purpose or goal—this goal provides the glue that holds the system together
- A well-functioning system would pay particular attention to nurturing and sustaining cooperation, coordination and collaboration among all levels of stakeholders, including those managing key activities as well as those performing key functions.
- A system will achieve its desired outcomes when it designs, implements, and sustains an effective and efficient process of care in which stakeholders are held accountable for both their individual performance as well as the performance of the overall system.
- An effective governance structure for such a system would need to be flexible and robust in the face of uncertainty, change and diversity.

Option 1: MRM-modeled Monitoring Mechanism

One potential monitoring mechanism would be to create a UN-housed global monitoring system similar to the MRM, but specifically designed to monitor attacks on education. The research team’s recommendation is to advise against the creation of such a mechanism. Consultations with practitioners revealed that there is little appetite for another large-scale MRM-style system. Some considered the MRM to have limited proven effectiveness given its costs. Due to the protracted timeframe from when a violation is reported to when the incident data reaches the Security Council and the Council takes a course of action, those persons who initially report may not perceive

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much value. The communities and stakeholders most affected by attacks see minimal impacts as a result of the system. Also, only a fraction of the violations that actually happen are reported through the MRM due to several factors including limited civil society participation in some countries and strict verification guidelines related to its particular mandate. Most importantly the political capital that was required for the creation of the MRM was vast. Even if an education-focused monitoring system did not need an additional Security Council resolution, the lobbying that would be required for its genesis would necessitate intense focus and advocacy resources from many stakeholders. There is little political will to lobby for such a system. For these reasons, the team does not recommend proceeding with a large-scale MRM-like monitoring system.

**Option 2: Independent Projects/Initiatives**

There are research endeavors or investigations that could provide useful information to for responding to attacks on education. The activities suggested in the next section, for example, could be supported as independent projects and not as part of system development. However, this would not constitute a global system. One or more of these activities could be funded, designed and carried out by a single organization, or a group of organizations, as a special initiative but outside an effort to develop a global information monitoring arrangement per se. The monitoring focus, research design, analysis and dissemination of information to relevant stakeholders would be the responsibility of a given organization or group.

Independently supported initiatives can be implemented quickly and build on current momentum, without requiring a new formal coordinating structure. A funder or group of funders for such independent initiatives could undertake to ensure communication and coordination between various initiatives, and presumably would have some role, along with the given organizations involved, in determining the focus of projects and data generated. Such an approach may therefore be most suitable for filling immediate, known gaps in monitoring of priority areas or countries. But it is unlikely to transcend the current project driven environment and produce a fully global monitoring system, which would require more formal coordinating structures. Moreover without formal collaboration, independent projects may suffer from a lack of expert input on data needs, research methodology, and resources. There may be little impetus or capability for disseminating monitoring data to those outside of a defined project’s target scope, including many who may have the greatest need and utility for it.

Applying the CDC’s criteria for evaluating surveillance systems to this type of “independent monitoring architecture highlights the shortcomings of such a structure. As independent monitoring endeavors will not take directly cater to the data needs of many actors, the “usefulness” of data will be limited to the uses envisaged by the acting organization(s). “Flexibility” will also be limited as a limited stakeholder initiative will not have the benefit of many diverse actors and organizations offering expertise for a variety of situations and needs. “Acceptability” which “reflects the willingness of persons and organizations to participate in the surveillance system” will be hampered. “Sensitivity”, “representativeness” and “timeliness” will likely be weaker under monitoring endeavors conducted as independent initiatives than they would under a robust network of diverse organizations, experts and monitors which could utilize the added-value of each participant. Additionally, under an “independent”

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architecture, the “stability”\(^{51}\) of a monitoring system could only benefit from the financial, and other, resources of one or a few organizations, as opposed to the wide range of financial, intellectual and human capital available via a network involving the mainstream global actors.

**Option 3. Global Investigative Network for Attacks on Education (GIN)**
The feasibility study team’s overarching recommendation is to establish a Global Investigative Network (GIN)\(^{52}\) to serve as the knowledge leader for attacks on education. The GIN would meet the information needs of the international community by:

- Generating information on attacks on education;
- Analyzing trends and developments;
- Providing updates on priority countries;
- Making research findings available to a variety of community, educational, national, regional and global actors.

The GIN would be developed under the auspices of an independent and impartial group of actors committed to civil society monitoring on the humanitarian and developmental consequences of attacks on education. The group would employ information generated through the GIN to influence diverse audiences, including government, non-governmental, international, media and the public. The Global Coalition to Prevent Attacks on Education (GCPEA) is a viable group to serve in this capacity. Enhancing detection and response at the country level would be a key priority. There are various ways to achieve detection and response objectives, including through mobilization of existing actors; secondary document reviews and data base sharing; and new investigative activities. But to galvanize action beyond a “business as usual” approach, the research team recommends that an information officer be placed within the education cluster or the protection cluster on an experimental basis, and that the results of this pilot project be evaluated carefully for potential replication (see below)\(^{53}\). The responsibilities of the information officer would include the following:\(^{54}\)

- Serve as a focal point for information on attacks on education
- Collect existing information on monitoring priorities, including from humanitarian agencies, UN and NGO data bases, DPKO and other security reports, among other sources
- Brief existing monitoring actors (e.g. human rights monitors) to include specific monitoring and reporting of attacks on education
- Coordinate incidence, prevalence and ethnographic studies as described below
- Ensure information is disseminated to key in-country actors (to help trigger responses)
- Ensure major new developments, such as new attacks and policy reforms, are systematically recorded and updated regularly (see proposed national index template below)
- Ensure information is provided to the Global Coalition, including for use in its annual global report (see global report component below)

Global projects could also be developed as synergistic components of the GIN. Several of these projects, or elements, are outlined in the next section, but they might include:

\(^{51}\) Stability refers to the operational reliability and availability to provide data.

\(^{52}\) Or partnership

\(^{53}\) If successful, donor countries would be asked to fund such a position as part of its routine support for education in crisis contexts.

\(^{54}\) Depending on circumstances, the information officer might also serve as a trainer to strengthen field-based responses to education-related threats.
• Fact sheets and country profiles summarizing developments in each country (see indicative national index template) generated through primary and secondary data collection;
• A periodic global report that would be enhanced by the GIN’s country and global projects;
• Database project to link and harmonize data collection efforts undertaken by various actors; and,
• Network website to promote information dissemination and share lessons learned.
• A “hub of expertise” would also be identified to provide ongoing training and technical support to complete country investigations in a rigorous and timely manner.

Figure 2. Proposed Data Flows for Primary/Secondary Education GIN
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The importance of cooperation, coordination and collaboration is underscored in this systems model, as well as an enhanced collective ability to effect change at country and global levels. A GIN committed to achieving specific results would provide clear data collection objectives and activities, and enhance information and feedback loops at and between country, regional and global levels.

At the same time, this approach would require broad buy-in and ongoing coordinating between a diverse set of stakeholders. The plan also presupposes financial investments at country and global levels. Determining which Global Coalition member would be responsible for different GIN components could also pose political issues; whereas consolidating all functions under an umbrella mechanism would potentially undermine the diversity of participation required to achieve results.

It will be important to build the system incrementally. It is not necessary to build a system from the outset that monitors every data need for every responder. To prove that this approach and data collection is needed, starting small and focusing on one response or one country would be a way to pilot the approach and learn.

As described above, the GIN covers attacks on primary and secondary education. However, it is feasible to include higher education actors within the GIN as well. A higher education sub-network within the GIN could ensure that specific higher education concerns are addressed in higher education-specific monitoring efforts. The development of Regional Higher Education Monitors (see below) could also occur under the auspices of a GIN.

Proposed Regional Higher Education Monitors (RHEM) Network/Sub-Network

Higher education currently lacks most of the national and locally-based monitoring frameworks in place for primary and secondary education. Attacks on higher education therefore remain generally underreported, and information about attacks that is captured is often not well coordinated within the sector or mobilized to produce effective results for actors on the ground. A principal aim of a global monitoring system therefore should be to increase the collection, flow and return of information related to attacks on higher education.

As an initial step, a global monitoring system encompassing higher education could establish a network or system of regional higher education monitors and collectors of data (RHEMs), whose function would be to capture attack information and funnel it through a global higher education consolidator (GHEC). This system could be a sub-system of the GIN described above.

A combined system or network of RHEMs and GHEC could immediately increase reporting of attacks on higher education and, in the process, promote more regional, national and local awareness, interest in, and avenues for reporting on attacks. The data collected through a RHEMs/GHEC system could immediately begin to inform other components of a global monitoring system, such as country reporting, and fuel responses through higher education actors, domestic legal reform/trials, complaints to international human rights actors etc. Because of the current lack of significant local or national higher education structures for monitoring attacks, this type of network would be particularly suited to the higher education context, but is not recommended for primary and secondary education concerns.

A RHEMs/GHEC system or network would capture primarily incident data, although some incidence and prevalence data may also be available. RHEMs would be primarily responsible for: advertising their role
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to encourage voluntary reporting of attacks; receiving reports of attacks in their region; conducting independent observations; verifying reports received using primary (to the extent practical) and secondary sources; and bundling the data on attacks for regular transmission to the GHEC for consolidation across regions and public dissemination. RHEMS may also help to verify allegations of attacks received at the global-level.

As initially envisioned, the RHEMs would produce a confidential monthly summary report on attacks on higher education in their respective regions for transmission to the GHEC. The monthly reports would use a standard format or template (perhaps set up online), ideally employing an agreed upon prioritization and indicators of attacks, and standard procedures for filtering and attempting to verify information received from reporters of attacks. The GHEC would receive and consolidate the reports into a monthly summary report on attacks on higher education globally, to be circulated via public email bulletin and/or online. At a minimum, these reports would contain basic information on incidents occurring during the reporting period and updates on prior reported incidents. Over time, these reports may include additional background information and information on incidence and/or prevalence of certain types of attacks. The GHEC could also easily consolidate 12 monthly reports into an annual summary report that would fill a current gap in information and provide readily available data for other global monitoring system components, including a formal and more detailed annual global report along the lines of Education Under Attack. Over time, as monthly and annual reports from a RHEMs/GHEC system or network gain in circulation and awareness, increasing levels of self-reporting from national and local actors to the RHEMs should be expected, and increasing levels of sophistication could be built in to any intake or reporting formats. But at the outset even relatively modest levels of information gathering and reporting would go a significant way toward filling the current gaps in higher education monitoring and awareness.

Many individuals and organizations in the higher education sector already have the experience and skills in research, writing and reporting necessary to serve as effective monitors and reporters, and likely would be willing to do so if proper incentive structures and modest resources were in place. A global monitoring system could start modestly by supporting a core group of approximately 6-12 RHEMs and one GHEC. The RHEMs and GHEC may be academics, academic research centers or NGO/advocates having experience related to attacks on education. Ideally, each RHEM would be provided with sufficient support to cover part-time research assistants to monitor media and local sources, while the RHEM him/herself would assess the information gathered and approve all submissions to the GHEC. Potential RHEMs and GHEC could be identified through the funder’s network and/or networks of associated organizations, or chosen through a selective process. The regional location of the RHEMs should be determined by a prioritization system, which takes into account the need for greater monitoring, patterns of known attacks within a region, safety and access to information and resources for communication, institutional support, and geographic inclusivity. Geographic location of the GHEC would be less important than institutional support, familiarity with issues of attacks and monitoring, links to various regions and potential sources of information on attacks, and involvement with or access to potential responders to attacks reported.

As envisioned, a RHEMs/GHEC system or network is a relatively low-cost way to immediately increase reporting of attacks on higher education, to raise the profile of the issue within and outside the sector, and to identify and test other possible components of a global monitoring system, such as a prioritization of attacks and related indicators, country reporting, or in-depth incidence and prevalence studies. Funding would be required initially for a test period (1-3 years) for part-time support for the RHEMs and GHEC, research assistance, and modest administrative costs (phone allowance, materials,
possibly some travel funds). Some infrastructure development would be helpful, for example development of standard intake and reporting forms, private online reporting surveys or a private online database for consolidating reports. Costs for these would be largely one-time and front-loaded. Assuming the RHEMs and GHEC are academics or NGO researchers with relevant experience, only limited training would be required. Ideally, a regular meeting of RHEMs and GHEC would be organized, perhaps annually, to exchange information and good practices. A RHEMs/GHEC system or network could exist independent of or in concert with other components of a global monitoring system or other pilot initiatives.

Figure 3. Proposed Data Flows for Higher Education Information Network/Sub-Network
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10 POTENTIAL MONITORING ELEMENTS

The following components of monitoring work could be implemented individually as pilot projects or in combination to provide multiple data sets. Over time, they also would add greatly to the development of a global monitoring system for attacks on education. While several projects might be country/region-focused, others require a global perspective. There can be an incremental approach with implementation as well. Projects can be piloted in one or more locations and then evaluated to determine effectiveness in achieving their purposes.

The below components are broken down by the level at which the data could be collected and collated – either at country level or at a global/regional level. Obtaining data at the country level is a priority and any monitoring system should strive to focus on that level which then feeds into a regional and global reporting structure. There are synergies between these levels as represented by the chart below. Data collected at the country level directly feeds into the information sharing efforts at the global/regional levels.

10.1 Country level actions

10.1.1 Country Investigations and Studies

10.1.1.1 Purpose
Data collection at the country level is considered to be the essential component of a global information system. Depending on response objectives, the data needed to trigger desired responses would need to be collected through country-specific investigations and studies. Different research methodologies would therefore be required as well. Objectives of country investigations and studies might include:

- Gaining true prevalence or incidence rates of attacks in a given country or sub-region of a country;
- Gaining in-depth information on targets, methods and nature of attacks;
- Gaining in-depth information on the context, motives and/or impact of attacks;
- Evaluating the effectiveness of specific responses to attacks;
- Documenting best identification-response practices.

Country investigations also would enable an incrementally built global system based on detection and response results.

10.1.1.2. Proposed Methods
The methods for country investigations and studies will vary based on context and response objectives. Examples include:

- Prevalence/Monitoring Effectiveness Study: Prevalence studies may be conducted in a single location, multiple locations within a single region/country, or in multiple locations globally. There are a variety of specific methodologies that can be employed, but generally speaking, most prevalence studies will involve some method of sampling (likely multi-stage cluster sampling) and survey interviews. In researching attacks on schools, school sites can potentially be sampled rather than households, thus decreasing the size of the survey.
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- Community Response/Best Practices Case Study: There are multiple methodologies that can be used to understand best practices for community (or other) responses to attacks. One method is in-depth qualitative interviews with local educational communities themselves. The CARE “Knowledge on Fire” study offers a resource-intensive example of this model of qualitative research. The CARE study conducted over 1,000 interviews in 36 districts and 8 provinces of Afghanistan, as well as 559 focus group interviews. A potential pilot need not be as large and thorough as the CARE study to produce useful information. If conducted in multiple regions, countries or contexts, the findings of qualitative research can be compared and lessons can be learned for responses in disparate contexts.

- Trial/Evaluation of Response Effectiveness: There are several research methods that can be employed to investigate the effectiveness of responses in multiple areas including humanitarian, educational, and advocacy. An example methodology might be a comparative case study between multiple locations or regions where different response methods were being employed. Outcome and control variables would be measured to determine how effective each response was in protecting facilities, preventing attacks or ameliorating the effects of attacks.

There are numerous ways that these country investigations and studies could be developed. However, to maximize detection and response scenarios, they need to take place in the context of a local or country specific network that is capable of convening local actors, fomenting engagement from response actors, and work towards generating and using critical information. The three approaches outlined above, if done in isolation, would each individually fail to achieve desired response results if they took place outside of a local information system or community. That is why the research team recommends deployment (at least on a pilot basis) of a full-time country-level network information officer charged with facilitating and organizing a network and its activities, including data collection activities.

10.1.2 Support full-time network information officers in education or protection clusters

10.1.2.1 Purpose
Education and Protection Clusters currently working in conflict/emergency regions have access to a number of sources of information including security incidents, and protection and education data in particular.\textsuperscript{55} Given the operational nature of these actors, however, they are far from systematic in their data gathering, analysis, and dissemination. A network information officer would take the lead in the generation of country-level information and would assist in facilitating any monitoring efforts or studies.\textsuperscript{56} This network information officer would work to ensure attacks are identified, information disseminated and responses are triggered. The monitoring would thus be a key link in the development of a global monitoring system, especially as it pertains to attacks on pre-, primary and secondary schools.

10.1.2.2 Proposed Methods

\textsuperscript{55} For an example of how education attack data is currently reported via some education clusters, see Cote d’Ivoire Education Cluster, Attaques contre l’Education Rapport sur l’impact de la crise sur le système éducatif ivoirien -Rapport Numero 2, June 15, 2011.

\textsuperscript{56} Where applicable, the staff person might be hosted by an NGO member of the protection or education cluster to facilitate civil society monitoring and avoid many of the restrictions or political concerns that might hamper efforts if the individual were employed as UN staff.
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A pilot/trial placement of full time network information officers within the education or protection cluster in a territory experiencing an ongoing armed conflict would be a cost-effective means of enhancing detection and response at the country level. The network information officer would track information collection using agency reports, security data, OCHA sit-reps and other country-based information flows. The officer would seek to improve incident reporting through establishing SMS reporting systems and promoting country investigations and studies as described immediately below. He/she would further seek to promote and coordinate response. Moreover, if results are achieved through a series of initial pilot efforts, there would also be ample grounds for GIN members to lobby country donors to ensure such placements take place on a normative basis.

10.1.2.3 Outputs/Uses
This proposal would produce in-depth, timely and continuous incident data useful for country-based responses including emergency education responses as well as domestic and global reform. The information could be condensed and input into a format similar to the draft Education Under Attack Report Card which could then be sent to a regional/global body who would synthesize this country level information and be responsible for dissemination.57

A cluster-based network information officer also has an additional benefit of maintaining the issue of attacks on education on the agenda and placing it at the forefront of cluster work and information collection. In some countries where attacks are regularly taking place, the cluster has not been tasked with collecting this information and so much of it, while known anecdotally, is lost in terms of monitoring. It is often recorded in situation reports, giving evidence that the capacity to collect the information exists, but typically the information is not systematically utilized or disseminated to actors outside the UN or education fields.

With a designated person there to oversee and disseminate the information, a more formalized system can be put in place. As local civil society groups are typically involved in the cluster, information from community groups should be available. A concern would be the ability of the stakeholders to actively provide responses at the community level to ensure continued partnerships and communication with community groups. However, being placed at the cluster with all of the relevant actors present, this method has the highest likelihood of achieving some response to the community, even if it is merely communication and feedback on the status of the reporting.

10.1.2.4 Operational/Feasibility Concerns
The cluster structure and activities vary from country to country. In countries where the cluster is decentralized, it may be difficult to obtain information of consistent quantity and quality across provinces/regions. If a monitor is placed at the country level it is unclear how s/he would collect data from such a diverse body of stakeholders spread throughout a country. In countries where there is a small geographic span (e.g. oPt) this may be more feasible than in places where the geographic span is vast and the direct reach limited (i.e. Pakistan, DRC or Afghanistan). There may need to be more than one monitor in these cases.

A model for this system is currently available in countries (e.g. oPt) where both the education and protection clusters are collaborating to provide data on attacks on education. Examining this model and the staffing structure used there would be a good first step. Choosing additional countries where the designated monitor could gain traction and momentum would be advised. It is recommended to start in

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one country for a year and evaluate the effectiveness of the monitor in terms of outcomes and data uses. If there is no deemed benefit, than another mechanism should be used. Consultations should be utilized to determine whether the protection or education cluster would be best suited for the embedding of a monitor.\textsuperscript{58}

10.1.3 Allow local informants to trigger enhanced monitoring

10.1.3.1 Purpose
Local informants are essential components of any global monitoring system, as local actors generally have significant information both about attacks and the responses needed. Yet informants to this study repeatedly indicated that local actors may be reluctant to provide information about attacks to global monitors when doing so is perceived as unlikely to trigger meaningful responses on the ground. A global monitoring system may therefore wish to explore ways to empower local reporters with greater input over the allocation of monitoring resources and the choice of response methods. This would create additional incentives for local reporters to provide information (above and beyond their existing incentives to see effective responses to such attacks) by guaranteeing an on the ground response. Such built-in triggers would of course have to be carefully constructed and disclosed, and information provided would have to be verified to ensure that the trigger is not being manipulated. But, where politically and institutionally feasible, such triggers could significantly increase local reporting and thereby enhance the ability of a global monitoring system to gather timely information about attacks.

10.1.3.2 Proposed Methods
Built-in triggering systems would create incentives for greater local reporting of incident data, which could in turn contribute to understandings of incidence and prevalence. Triggers would consist of pre-disclosed reporting thresholds which if met would activate heightened response activity on the part of the global monitoring system or one of its components. For example, a global monitoring system that seeks to receive voluntary reports from local actors might make it known that a defined volume of reports over a defined period of time would trigger heightened investigation in the form of a site visit and/or country report. The trigger system could consist of resources and response capacity available “on call” for deployment if the trigger threshold is met. Alternatively, the trigger could consist of granting local reporters who satisfy the threshold a significant voice in allocating response resources.

10.1.3.3 Outputs/Uses
One output for an effective built-in trigger system for attacks on education would be increased local reporting and investment in monitoring. In addition, there would be specific outputs of “triggered” responses, such as case or country reports, which would be determined by the needs of the local actors and capabilities of the respondents.

10.1.3.4 Operational/Feasibility Concerns
Establishing a built-in trigger system for attacks on education could be a relatively low-cost way to better incentivize local actors reporting attacks. Costs would include the expense of suitable heightened

\textsuperscript{58} Recent deployment of information officers to the education clusters in Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan to assist the cluster coordinator have provided increased reporting on the incidence and impact of attacks on education. The implications of this new approach for the global monitoring of attacks on education will hopefully be explored in the coming period.
response activities such as site visits or country reports. But presumably some of these activities would already be contemplated within a global monitoring system. The concept of a trigger system therefore is not about additional costs, but about granting local actors a voice in the allocation of any such response resources within the global system. Similarly, the concept of a trigger system is not a free-standing component of monitoring, per se, but a possible way to construct various components to increase local input.

In developing a built-in trigger system, it will be important to carefully define the triggering actions to guard against manipulation and inaccuracies in reporting and analysis. Challenges may include significant difficulty in identifying suitably attractive “triggered” responses that are also feasible within the financial, institutional or political constraints of any global monitoring system. To address these challenges, additional consultation and research into local actors’ needs, desired responses and concerns about reporting may be advised before attempting to implement a trigger system.

10.1.4 Pre-identify specific response vector systems for greater local response/impact

10.1.4.1 Purpose

As noted above, informants to this study repeatedly indicated that local actors may be reluctant to provide information about attacks to global monitors when doing so is perceived as unlikely to trigger meaningful responses on the ground. Advance identification and targeting of specific, desired response vectors may be a way of increasing both local reporting and the likelihood of meaningful local response.

As discussed in earlier outputs, different actors have various data needs, which result in different kinds of responses. A response vectors system would carefully monitor specific types of attack data necessary to trigger a specific response, and then deliver that data through a pre-determined stakeholder-monitor to the target respondent capable of delivering the desired response. For example, if the attack consists of the killing of a teacher or academic, the desired response may be an investigation or inquiry. Likely respondents capable of conducting or triggering an inquiry may include the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings. NGO-advocacy groups within the global monitoring system may transfer the information to the Special Rapporteur and follow-up to prod for suitable response.

10.1.4.2 Proposed Methods

Response vector system is not a data collection method but a strategy for deploying data for greatest response. The data used in a response vectors system would be whatever type of data the stakeholder-monitor would need to prod the target-respondent to act. Incident reporting may be sufficient for triggering investigations or inquiries of the killings of students, teachers or academics, whereas incidence or prevalence data may be required to trigger meaningful responses to occupation or destructions of multiple facilities, or interference with student or staff associations. A response vector system would facilitate more timely use of data by pre-determining use. Response would begin when a specified attack occurred and a local reporter provides the necessary data (collected through an appropriate and relevant methodology) to the system. The specific types of attacks triggering a vector response could be limited to those included in a prioritization system.

An incomplete example of possible response vectors for triggering international response is shown in the table below.
Table 7. Possible Response Vectors for Triggering International Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>Vector Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stakeholder-monitor using data to trigger response (incomplete lists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possible target respondent(s) (incomplete lists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desired local response(s) (incomplete lists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Killings</td>
<td>NGO advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Occupation or destruction of facilities</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Wrongful detention, imprisonment or prosecution of staff or students</td>
<td>NGO advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Interference with student or staff associations</td>
<td>Union advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Censorship, including self-censorship, due to violence or coercive force/authority</td>
<td>Academic or public policy organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.1.4.3 Outputs/Uses

Outputs from an effective response vectors system for attacks on education would be increased local reporting, better coordination and use of information collected, and increased local responses.

10.1.4.4 Operational/Feasibility Concerns

Establishing a response vector system for attacks on education is a relatively low-cost way to increase incentives for local reporting and maximize use of collected information to trigger effective, on the ground responses. Costs may include costs of pressuring activities by stakeholder-monitors, within the overall global monitoring system, but presumably some of these activities would already be contemplated within a global monitoring system. The concept of a vector system is not about additional costs, but about pre-determining strategies for using data collected in ways that are most likely to produce effective responses. Similarly, the concept of a response vector system is not a free-standing
component of monitoring, per se, but a possible way to link-up various components to increase local reporting and response.

In developing a response vector system, challenges may include significant difficulty in identifying suitably attractive responses that are also feasible within the financial, institutional or political capabilities of target respondents who are themselves capable of being prodded into action by stakeholder-monitors within the system. To address these challenges, additional consultation and research may be needed with global advocates, key target-respondents, and local actors.

10.2 Global/Regional Level Activities

Global or regional level data on attacks is necessary for many advocacy efforts as well as for organizational decision making regarding priorities or areas of focus. Many advocacy responses require estimations of the global scope of the issue of attacks on education as well comparative data between multiple countries or regions. The following four approaches comprise the research team’s recommendations for a GIN’s initial efforts at securing high quality global-level data on attacks on education. Each approach will require the collaboration of many actors. Additionally, there are synergies between each of these approaches and those proposed at the country level. The team therefore recommends that the global components be situated within the proposed GIN and developed within organizations that comprise the Global Coalition to Prevent Attacks on Education.

10.2.1 Enhanced Global Reports

10.2.1.1 Purpose

The purpose of the periodic global reports would be to provide baseline evidence of attacks on education at the country level. The model for this style of report, the UNESCO *Education Under Attack* reports, was cited as one of the most effective reports for advocacy purposes and as the primary global advocacy source and tool for protecting education from attack. The data collected would be global in nature, it would be based on incidents and would keep the information current for advocacy purposes.

10.2.1.2 Proposed Methods

A global report could be produced almost exclusively using secondary data collection methods. The main method of data collection would require frequent and consistent communication with in-country field agents working with key stakeholders, and direct telephone interviews. These country-based monitors would need to be identified through a snowball methodology aimed at producing a network of contacts. The information provided by these agents would be enhanced by additional desk research. Documents which can be reviewed for additional incident data include the annual U.S. State Department human rights reports, the semi-annual Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reports, Asian Human Rights Network reports, Education International bulletins and other publicly available reports. Additionally, systematic and continuous media searches can be utilized to collect incident data and leads for follow-up inquiries.

10.2.1.3 Outputs/Uses

59 The development of human interest content is important in making the report readable and therefore accessible to a wide audience.
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The reports would document available country-level incident data. They would further include counts of various attacks and where available context information, motive, perpetrator and impact data. Additionally, the reports could valuably compile qualitative data describing the impact and context of attacks. The incident data would provide a minimal estimate of incidents. The global reports could also compile the country level legal and political data cited by stakeholders as needed data for advocacy. This data would include review of ratification/legislation/adjudication concerning the protection of education from attack at the country level.

This type of report is most useful for advocacy-level responses. Human rights advocates have cited that the EUA report is an important tool for them for several purposes. Whether advocating with government officials and intergovernmental diplomats or meeting with potential funders, the global report has been used as evidence of the pertinence of the issue of attacks and the need for greater attention to the issue.

10.2.1.4 Operational/Feasibility Concerns

This option would be financially and logistically feasible as it would not require travel and could be collated with one full-time staff member. It is important information to collect continuously in order to maintain a spotlight on the issue of attacks on education and document trends over time. It is likely that the number of incidents collected in the report will increase with the amount of resources available for the project. The Education Under Attack reports were produced by a single researcher. Multiple researchers or increased hours may increase the amount of data collected, although at some level the value added of additional hours or researchers will likely taper off.

There are some drawbacks to this approach as a stand-alone research endeavor. First, the Education Under Attack 2010 report received considerable political push-back. Certain countries refuted the findings. For this reason, a small review committee should in future review the drafts to strengthen buy-in and anticipate any political problems. It should be noted further that the data collected, although extensive, is not detailed enough for legal, humanitarian responses or those needing UN-verified data. With secondary data collection, there is a potential for overlooking local input. And without population-based, rigorous data collection, it is not possible to generalize estimates of incidence or prevalence rates.

While this is an important component to the overall response framework, a report of this kind can be enhanced with additional research confirming and expanding its findings. As mentioned, as a stand-alone report, it only has effectiveness as an advocacy tool and keeping the issue current. More in depth research, as will be described below, will be important to move the issue ahead and provide necessary information for more targeted responses. The first report would cover the period July 2009 to a date in 2012, to follow on from Education under Attack 2010 (which itself followed on consecutively from the 2007 edition).

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60 The 2010 report (about 80,000 words) was produced by one writer/researcher working a six-day week for about six months, supported by source checkers and one detailed reader plus oversight, supplemented by the endeavours of field contacts who looked for or provided information on request. One problem was the paucity of the translation budget, - it would be helpful to have native Spanish and French speaking assistance research assistance in future (or interns).
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It will be necessary to consult heavily with key stakeholders that have strong experience in producing this type of report. Much can be learned regarding strategy and methodology from those involved with reports such as *Education Under Attack* and *Global Reports on Children and Armed Conflict*.

10.2.2 Data-sharing Website Development

10.2.2.1 Purpose

The purpose of a website would be to act as an information hub for protecting education from attack. It could act as the portal for the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack and/or a Global Investigative Network and would be regularly updated with news related to attacks on education.

10.2.2.2 Proposed Methods

The website would be appropriate for public visitors with open access, and could also have a restricted section for experts and field programmers. Monitors at the country level would have to feed information to the site administrator who would have to compile and upload it.

10.2.2.3 Outputs/Uses

There will be a number of uses for the website, mainly as means to store and provide information related to attacks on education. Potential information that could be stored within the two access types include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open Access</th>
<th>Restricted access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• News feed of reports of incidents,</td>
<td>• Secure means to gather information from the field for early warning, to prompt responses or to add to global data and reporting. This would include contact details to provide information in confidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Archive of reports of incidents</td>
<td>• Establish dialogue via chatrooms or structured discussions on sensitive issues to share problems and best practice and collaborate on responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promote relevant studies/publications/news/reports from workshops</td>
<td>• Data and information collection guidance to encourage the gathering of common data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collect related studies/papers/tools/resources or links to provide access to them in one place</td>
<td>• Resource bank of specialist tools for protecting education from attack to encourage responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Publish reporting and analysis of trends</td>
<td>• Data and information collection guidance to encourage the gathering of common data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Publish global alerts and press releases/background information for advocacy campaigns</td>
<td>• Resource bank of specialist tools for protecting education from attack to encourage responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide links to all partners and others as relevant</td>
<td>• Shared data outside the public domain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.2.2.4 Operational/Feasibility Concerns

Persons at country level would have to be identified to regularly provide or input the necessary information. Without these actors, the timeliness and relevance of the site becomes moot. Therefore, considerable buy-in and agreement from persons in the field is necessary, as reporting on the information in the format requested, may be additional work. Also, the internal aspect of the site must provide added value to practitioners so that it is a living and useful mechanism. Without this, the website will quickly be an obsolete investment. Serious investigation into what practitioners want to see on the website will be key to ensuring that it has applicability and use.
Due consideration should also be given and consultations made to ensure that any website complements, rather than competes with, current activities of relevant stakeholders, including websites, so as to encourage full buy-in and most efficient delivery of information. (One possibility, for example, may be to make any new website content embeddable within stakeholders’ existing sites, rather than requiring users to navigate away to a stand-alone site.)

10.2.3 Establish Priority Attacks, Indicators and Baselines for Attacks (all levels)

10.2.3.1 Purpose

The scope of attacks on education is too broad and varied to lend itself easily to categorization, let alone comprehensive monitoring of all attacks at all levels at all times. To fuel more effective responses to attacks in the near term, it may be useful to establish a prioritization system, including standardized indicators and associated baselines. Such prioritization would allow greater standardization of data collection methodologies and templates, as well as greater focus on specific responses. Over time, such prioritization could be expanded to include a wider range of attacks.

A prioritization system could be developed for all levels of education, or distinct prioritization schemes may be warranted for primary/secondary education versus higher education, depending primarily on what components of a global monitoring system would be utilizing the prioritization and what actors are involved in the monitoring and any subsequent reporting or responses.

10.2.3.2 Proposed Methods

A prioritization system might narrow the scope of attacks to perhaps 5-10 of the most violent, widespread and/or egregious types for initial monitoring, although this may be difficult. Great care should be taken to include those types of attacks of greatest interest or concern to key stakeholders, and especially local stakeholders who are potential voluntary reporters of local information on attacks. Establishing prioritization would require developing standardized definitions, indicators of specific attacks, verification criteria and formats for reporting (input and output) of data. Indicators may need pairing with baseline measures in order to guard against misleading conclusions. For example, a decrease in persons detained in a given year may mean improved conditions, or it may mean that effective attacks on education in prior years have reduced the population of dissenting professors through intimidation, violence and exile.

Table 8. Illustrative List of Attacks with Indicators and Baselines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Killings, abductions or disappearances</td>
<td># of education community members killed, abducted or disappeared</td>
<td>Not needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including as child soldiers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Occupation, damage or destruction of</td>
<td># of days of occupation or loss of use</td>
<td>Not needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another viewpoint is that prioritization should not lead to neglect of collection of information on attacks that do not fall within the priority categories for data, e.g. information collected through interviews and media reports. There might also be differences in prioritization with different sub-sectors, such as schools or universities.
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| 3. Wrongful detention, imprisonment or prosecution of staff or students | # of persons detained, imprisoned or prosecuted | tbd |
| 4. Interference with student or staff associations | tbd | tbd |
| 5. Censorship, including self-censorship, due to violence or coercive force/authority | Survey responses | Prior survey responses |
| 6. Other? | |

10.2.3.3 Outputs/Uses
The outputs of a prioritization system would include standard definitions, indicators and baselines of a defined sub-set of priority attacks. These will facilitate collection, monitoring and reporting of incidents, incidence and prevalence. In addition to facilitating collection of new data, if paired with standardized data-coding recommendations, such prioritization may also encourage greater sharing of data already collected and held by various stakeholders in different formats, which would increase the overall pool of data available for monitoring and response activities.

10.2.4. Exploratory Database Study

10.2.4.1 Purpose
Several organizations, such as UNHCHR, OCHA, UNHCR, and a number of NGOs have database projects that may contain information on attacks on education, as may some defence and security databases. Any database that records data on general attacks or violence may potentially record attacks on education even if they are not labeled as such. It is unclear whether this information is shared between the current databases and whether the potential information on attacks on education is actively utilized. It would therefore be useful to support a research project to identify relevant databases and explore operational linkages.

10.2.4.2 Proposed Methods
The primary methods would include desk research and interviews with developers of the databases; face-to-face meetings, and if possible, an analysis of the actual databases and their components and/or a review workshop.

10.2.4.3 Outputs/Uses
The initiative would identify a set of actors amenable to sharing information and/or linking database efforts, thereby enhancing routine data collection efforts over the long term. There may be opportunities to extract education-specific attack data or to engage organizations to include database variables that would clearly indicate attacks on education. Also, this research will yield lessons about how the databases came into being, what the challenges and key considerations were, steps taken for buy-in, training, and data flows which could contribute to the thinking with respect to developing an education database. Eventually a shared set of indicators could be developed to enhance consistency and quality of data collection efforts.

10.2.4.4 Operational/Feasibility Concerns
The investigation will be limited by the exposure that researchers gain to database managers and the databases themselves. Learning, of course, will be limited to the willingness of organizational contacts to share information, and access to data may be limited due to confidentiality and security concerns. Reaching data sharing agreements within and between agencies may require considerable time and political agreement—and may never reach a level of cooperation to make such an effort worthwhile.
11. RESOURCING

Development of a Global Information Network would require simultaneous investments at the country, regional and global levels. General cost estimates are provided below. However, it is difficult to develop more detailed budgets for each potential monitoring project. This is for three major reasons:

1. **Variation in Costs Across National and Regional Settings.** Significant investment is proposed at the country-level, building national and regional capacities to enable more effective global monitoring. The costs of such developments are highly dependent on local costs, which vary markedly from one setting to another. Budget estimation for such work may proceed more effectively when specific countries are being considered for support.

2. **Interdependence of Proposed Developments.** Although the research team has sought to articulate a concrete agenda of specific activities that would work to strengthen global monitoring of attacks on education, it is clear that these activities are not best seen as independent ‘initiatives’ but elements of a global monitoring ‘system’. Such inter-dependence brings significant scope for cost-sharing and integration of function, rather than funding ‘silod’ developments. Developments can be more effectively costed when the likelihood of simultaneous activities – and thus synergies and efficiencies – can be judged.

3. **Implications of Strategic Engagement by Key Stakeholders.** The costs of outlined developments will also be significantly determined by the engagement, or otherwise, of key stakeholders. Building upon the institutional capacities and mandates of existing stakeholders will bring significant cost-savings with respect to what is otherwise a major task of global advocacy and institutional development. When the interests of key stakeholders regarding the outlined developments have been determined, tangible cost estimates will be more readily achieved.

Given these caveats, the following resource estimates are provided for the monitoring activities that will require the most significant investment. Staff costing will depend on local/expatriate status, full/part time status and other considerations. Administrative costs might be estimated at up to 15% above salary costs.

11.1 **Country Level**

The research team suggests placing information officers in country level clusters, and quantitative and qualitative investigations to take place throughout the country. Implementing these activities within 2-4 countries per year would represent a sufficient level of annual activity to trigger the GIN.

**Cluster monitor**

This component of the GIN could begin with pilots in 2 countries in year one, followed by an additional two countries in year two. Careful monitoring and evaluation of results in these four countries should be pursued, and if significant value added is identified, an concerted advocacy campaign should be launched to ensure similar efforts are consistently supported by donor countries in other countries and in subsequent internationally subsidized humanitarian operations.

**Field Investigations**
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Information officers would also support additional investigations required to achieve desired response results. A hub of international research expertise should be identified in advance and relied upon to support rigorous work in this area. Partnerships with interested parties, such as CDC, could lead to cost sharing.\(^6^2\)

11.2 Regional level

The proposal for regional action relates to higher education, as a response to the lack of current reporting mechanisms from country level. Regional monitors may be able to document incidents that would be difficult to document at country level, and may have local understanding and connections (and associated language skills) relevant to the task.

**Regional Higher Education Monitors**

Regional Higher Education Monitors (RHEMs) could be piloted globally or within one region, with the latter preferable for greater depth of coverage. For example, 4-6 monitors could be assigned to global regions, for example Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa/Middle East, Asia, or the same 4-6 monitors might all be assigned to sub-regions in Asia, for example North, East, South, Southeast, Central and Western (Middle East) Asia.\(^6^3\) An initial pilot period of 2-3 years would be required to demonstrate effectiveness as awareness and experience builds. To lessen costs and enhance sustainability, monitors could be selected from among established academics, institutes and NGOs.

11.3 Global level

Resource requirements at global level for monitoring and reporting work, annual report and advocacy are indicated below. These may overlap with each other and with planned Coalition staffing, so need to be reviewed in the light of Coalition planning.

**Global GIN Coordinator**

**GHEC – Global Higher Education Consolidator**

A Global Higher Education Consolidator (GHEC) should be piloted along with RHEMs. The number of regions included in the RHEM pilot will, to some extent, determine whether one or more persons is required within a GHEC. An initial pilot period of 2-3 years would be recommended to develop monitoring materials for the RHEMs and to demonstrate effectiveness over time.

\(^{6^2}\) Joint fundraising with a hub of expertise providing technical support is another option. Additionally, there are many types of field investigations that would not require a country-wide survey, thus drawing the cost down. The greatest variation in cost for population-based studies is typically the geographical coverage area.

\(^{6^3}\) Scholar Rescue Fund research (albeit not fully representative) showed the highest rates of attack in the Middle East/North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Additional support for annual or biennial meetings of the RHEMs and GHEC would be advisable but would depend upon the locations of the individuals or organizations involved.

Education Under Attack Reports
Staff, printing, editing and distribution costs.

Web site

Exploratory Database Study
A rigorous database exploration would require research and resources at the level of or greater than this current feasibility study, and would require prior enquiry to identify levels of effective access to relevant data.
### Table 9. List of Possible Monitoring Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Monitoring Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitors in Clusters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Country Pilot Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Higher Education Monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIN Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Under Attack Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data-Sharing Website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Higher Education Consolidators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory Database Study</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART THREE: FEASIBLE APPROACHES TO A GLOBAL MONITORING SYSTEM

12. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Throughout this feasibility study, the research team has sought to tie monitoring data to the needs of responders working to protect education, prevent attacks, and ameliorate the effects of attacks. Initially, this strategy allowed for the identification and categorization of responses, with each response requiring specific data from a monitoring system. As research progressed via key informant interviews and the Mid-Project Consultation of May 2-3, 2011, it became clear that while responses and responders may be discrete, there are actually strong synergies between responders in working towards more long-term objectives. For example, the objective of achieving domestic legal reform would require multiple types of advocacy responses from many responders including legal, political, human rights, humanitarian and community actors.

The synergies continue when examining both the types of data needed by responders and the methodologies required to collect different types of data. There are five main data types identified as necessary for a global monitoring system. These include incident data on attacks, incidence/prevalence data, qualitative information, evaluation/best practices evidence and data on legal/political actions. Most responses optimally require a combination of these types of data. Most data types can also be acquired by utilizing one or more of the four main research methodologies identified: primary data collection, secondary research, population-based studies and qualitative research. The multiple synergies between methodologies, data types, data uses by response actors and finally the actions of responders working towards long-term objectives, guided the research team in producing our final recommendations.

The research team recommends that the initial, and most important, step towards an improved global monitoring system should be the creation of a Global Information Network (GIN) and a Higher Education Network (or multiple RHEMs), either separately organized or integrated. A GIN will capitalize on the linkages between stakeholders, responses and data needs. Throughout consultations for this research, there has been enthusiasm and desire amongst diverse organizations to collaborate and share expertise and information to push this issue forward. An integrated system that leverages the linkages between these will ultimately be most successful. Linkages to human rights monitoring initiatives to strengthen their coverage of education will also be important. A GIN can also ensure that the information is disseminated in a way that can be utilized by this broad range of actors in a way that is timely, accurate and manageable.
The Research Group recommended a number of monitoring activities which may be priorities for the GIN. While each individual activity might provide valuable data for improving responses to attacks, a global monitoring system, and a successful GIN, will require a combination of multiple monitoring activities occurring simultaneously at the local, regional and global levels. Currently, there are limited, sporadic and unlinked activities occurring on an ad hoc basis. As advocated throughout this report an incremental approach is recommended. The diagrams below outline the various steps (both primary, secondary and higher education levels) that could be taken over the course of the next 5 years.
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Figure 4. Proposed Time Frame for Start-up and Development of a Global Investigative Network

Current Situation

**GMS Data Collection**
- Information Manager in clusters sometimes receives security/attack information but no systematic tracking (some exceptions)
- Higher Education NGOs – some monitoring activity but not comprehensive, not systematic, and lacking strong links with key responders
- Effectiveness studies conducted (ex. CARE report) but not on a regular basis

**Data Use/Responses**
- Annual Report - 2 EUA reports written, unclear whether this will continue
- Informal Data Sharing between agencies

1-3 Year Projection

**GMS Data Collection**
- Local reporters trained and positioned to increase monitoring (2-4 pilot countries)
- Cluster-based monitor piloted in 2-4 settings to collect country level data
- Regional Higher Education Monitors (RHEMs) piloted with 4-6 monitors
- Global Higher Education Consolidators (GHECs) piloted in 1 setting
- 1-2 Effectiveness studies to determine best practice to responding to attacks
- Database assessment to identify relevant databases and explore operational linkages

**Data Use/Responses**
- 1 EUA style annual report carried out
- Data-sharing - Website Development: Regularly updated with country/regional level monitoring data and outcomes of effectiveness studies.
- Pre-determine response vector activities (i.e. letter appeals, complaints, lobbying)
- Monthly email snapshot of conditions in all regions
- Fact sheets on national situations
- Position-advocacy papers for prevention, rehabilitation, etc
- National, regional and global level response plans
When considering whether and which countries or regions to pilot for any part of the monitoring system, the following criteria could be considered:

- **Contrasting circumstances**: Attacks on education occur in a range of settings and the contexts surrounding them may be specific. The types of violations, the victims, the perpetrators, the motives, and the impacts may not be uniform across conflicts and countries. Therefore, countries or regions could be selected that present a representative picture of the various circumstances.

- **Developed or sophisticated systems**: Some countries (e.g. oPt, Nepal) have developed on-the-ground, collaborative networks and other successful mechanisms and systems to monitor, document, report attacks on education and prevent and respond to these attacks. Piloting a monitoring system in a context where ‘success’ is more achievable could provide important findings, positive experiences, and build momentum that for subsequent field testing in more challenging situations. It will also be a useful way of achieving a ‘quick win’ to justify expanding the system in other countries.

- **Underdeveloped and challenging circumstances**: Other countries (such as the DRC or Central African Republic) have very weak institutions and civil society and have no record of addressing attacks on education. These countries present significant challenges to piloting a monitoring

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64 For more on selection of specific pilot countries, see Annex.
system but should be considered in order to contrast the more developed situations. These places can also contribute to a more comprehensive and holistic perspective for refinement of a monitoring system.

- Countries with political will: Identifying countries where there is political will and assets may have the greatest likelihood of success. These would be countries where there is local partner and stakeholder initiative that would be able to effectively use the information provided for their responses or prevention measures.

- Confidence with the partners: Countries where there is an established network open to the idea of monitoring and where there will be the least resistance to monitoring will help the system gain traction. This is the ‘go with your friends’ approach where a group already exists that is amenable to seeing the system advance. Avoiding political obstacles will be important in the initial stages while the approach and system is tested and gains momentum.

The monitoring system should be simultaneously built and activities carried out while analyzing effectiveness. In other words, it is not advised to engage in a long round of consultations to determine the best approach. Initial projects can be piloted and further monitoring initiatives can be initiated based upon the analysis of the results of these early projects.

It is important not to lose momentum that has been gained through the consultation components of current research. Initiating a small project or group of projects quickly will legitimize the work of this research and the contributions that many stakeholders made to it. The current main monitoring systems have proven most effective for advocacy purposes. However, including all practitioners (legal, human rights, education, humanitarian) in the discussions around efficacy and effectiveness of the system will be essential for continual refinement of purpose and scope. The effectiveness of monitoring initiatives should be evaluated with an eye towards future expansion or uptake of activities. Continual cost-benefit analysis will be important in justifying future expansion of the system. Donors must be ready to commit funding to effectiveness analysis and should not assume that operational agencies will conduct this on their own.

The first actions required to develop the GIN will be to determine the central organization(s) that will be leading the project. The GIN can exist under the auspices of an existing organization. The Global Coalition for Protecting Education from Attack would appear to be the most obvious organization to lead the pursuit of networking and collaboration between concerned organizations. The structures, approach, and strategies of the GIN will take shape over time and via consultations with many actors and stakeholders. A component of these initial development sessions will be to delineate the expertise, areas of interest, geographic foci, responses, and data needs, amongst other topics, of GIN member organizations/individuals. Additionally, it will be essential to define long-term goals and objectives of the GIN. A variety of data can be used in multiple ways by multiple responders.
### Annex 1. List of Participants at Mid-Project Review, May 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representative(s)</th>
<th>Organization/ Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ager, Alastair</td>
<td>CPC Learning Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Columbia University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander, Jessica</td>
<td>CPC Learning Network</td>
</tr>
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<td>Columbia University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allan, Utaukwa</td>
<td>Scholars at Risk Network</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NYU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Thani, Mubarak</td>
<td>Education Above All (EAA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bender, Lisa</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>Boothby, Neil</td>
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<td>Eastman, Jan</td>
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<td>Erwin, Courtney</td>
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<td>Harris, Hadar</td>
<td>American University, Washington</td>
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<td></td>
<td>College of Law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heninger, Lori</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jayasekaran, Subajini</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaisth, Daniela</td>
<td>Institute of International Education (IIE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laub, Tzvetomira</td>
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<tr>
<td>O’Malley, Brendan</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<tr>
<td>O’Neil, Bill</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council (SSRC)</td>
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<td>Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum</td>
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<td>Quinn, Robert</td>
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<td>NYU</td>
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<td>Richmond, Mark</td>
<td>Division for the Coordination of UN Priorities in Education, UNESCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roberts, Les</td>
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<td>Root, Brian</td>
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<td>Sheppard, Bede</td>
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<td>Children’s Rights Division</td>
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<td>Sinclair, Margaret</td>
<td>Education Above All (EAA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smith, Melinda</td>
<td>Global Coalition for Protecting Education from Attack (GCPEA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smith, Sarah</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee (IRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotomayor, Juana</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2. Exemplar Responses and Data Needs

The purpose of a global monitoring system is to provide timely information to trigger and inform effective preventive, protective and restorative responses to attacks on education. This purpose should provide clear data collection objectives and activities.

The utility of data is multitudinous as a single data point can be used in a variety of ways by a variety of actors. Examining long-term objectives of stakeholders working to protect education from attack provides a lens for understanding the data needs and uses of stakeholders. The Mid-Project Stakeholder Consultation provided examples of several long-term stakeholder objectives across the response spectrum. The exemplar objectives listed below exhibit how a blend of responses is necessary to achieve an objective. Functional collaboration among legal, political, education, community and/or humanitarian actors may be essential for achieving specific objectives.

Exemplar Objectives:

System-wide protective, restorative and preventive actions and policy development
Data is essential for actions such as enhancing security of education institutions and access routes, re-supply of education materials, temporary shelter, teacher deployment, policies regarding the school/academic year and examinations, etc, as well as for preventive actions such as revised criteria for education planning, reform of curricula and teacher training. All types of data discussed above are relevant to education system managers. Data will also guide other policy reforms such as military/rebel conduct of war (avoidance of occupation of schools, avoiding danger to students during operations, improved training on international humanitarian law, improved understanding of risks created by military involvement in reconstruction, etc).

Community Involvement in the Protection of Education
Stakeholders identified the involvement of local communities in the protection of education as a key part of a successful monitoring system. Examples include community management of educational facilities, negotiations with armed groups, community monitoring/watches, and increased security around schools. Humanitarian/education actor responses can include training with communities on best practices to protect education.

Data Needs:

- Qualitative data: Qualitative information on attacks including impacts and motives can provide learning on why education facilities are targeted and how they might be protected. Qualitative information on best practices for protection is also necessary.
- Incident data: Contextual data on attacks, such as facility level data, can provide greater understanding of why and how attacks occur. This information can be used to design more effective community responses.
- Effectiveness/Evaluation data: Data comparing the effectiveness of community responses is needed to determine best practices for responding in different contexts.

65 Similar exercises at country, regional and global levels would be useful in refining priority objectives.
Domestic Legal Reform

Stakeholders from the legal, human rights, humanitarian, and education spheres agreed at the Mid-Project Stakeholder Consultation that achieving domestic legal reform was a key objective in protecting education from attack. This legal reform could include any domestic legislation aimed at protecting education from attack, especially the prohibition of military use or occupation of education facilities. The responses involved in achieving domestic legal reform are primarily advocacy responses. Effective advocacy will likely require efforts at both the international and domestic levels as well as from human rights activists, the legal community, political actors and civil society. Legal shadow reports, NGO advocacy campaigns, human rights reports detailing the issue, and political lobbying are amongst the individual responses required.

Data Needs: The multiple data needs required for the advocacy, lobbying and reporting responses that might work towards bringing about domestic legal reform include:

- Prevalence data: National/community/regional level data on the prevalence of attacks is necessary to indicate the scope of the problem of attacks on education.
- Impact data: Research measuring the impact of attacks can extremely useful in highlighting why attacks on education are detrimental to society and ultimately the government. This data provides evidence to persuade government actors to give attention to the issue. Impact information can emerge from incident data, qualitative information and comparative effectiveness/evaluation studies.
- Data on legislation/ratification: Domestic and international advocates must understand the current state of domestic legislation and country level situations in order to target their work. This data can allow for comparison between countries and may highlight deficiencies in legislation.
- Incident data: Incident data provides evidence of violations and an understanding of the context of attacks as well as factors that might encourage or lead to attacks. This information is necessary to design and develop effective legislation and can be used at the advocacy, political and legal levels.

Domestic Trials (including military, criminal and/or civil)

Using existing legal legislation or following the implementation of new domestic legislation prohibiting or responding to attacks on education, as well as activities that result in attacks (such as facility occupation), domestic trials of perpetrators are a clear objective for stakeholders to work towards. In most countries, many attacks on education are currently illegal, especially the most directly violent attacks such as killing, sexual violence and abduction. However, prosecution specifically focused on attacks on education has been rare or non-existent at the domestic and international levels. For these cases, trial defendants could include state political or military personnel or non-state armed force members. Trials to prosecute attacks on education could potentially take place in domestic criminal, civil or military courts. The instigation of such trials would require advocacy responses from multiple actors including the legal community, human rights advocates, civil society and political leaders.
Data Needs: Successful prosecution requires legal-level evidence and testimony. Although a potential monitoring system could help produce this level of data, it is not necessarily that it do so. Although legal actors would welcome information from a monitoring system, they would likely conduct independent investigations as well. A monitoring system can produce data to trigger investigations by legal actors and ultimately domestic trials:

- Incident data: Quantitative incident data that provides documentation of attacks and the context of attacks including on perpetrators.
- Qualitative data: Qualitative data from victims and witnesses that can be used to help determine perpetrators, motives, and impacts of attacks.
- National Incidence/Prevalence Data: Can be used to compare locations_regions within countries to provide evidence of responsibility_guilt for attacks in specific locations and evidence of a wide geographic span of the violation.
- Surveillance Data: Continuous, longitudinal measurement of a standard indicator over time can provide evidence of “flare-ups” or heightened incidence of attacks during specific moments. This evidence could be used as a determinant of responsibility or guilt.

Complaints/Reports to International/Regional Human Rights Actors

There are numerous international and regional human rights actors including treaty bodies, intergovernmental human rights systems and courts. These include the Human Rights Council (HRC); the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the Committee Against Torture (CAT); the UN High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR); the UN Special Rapporteur/Representatives for (a) a country or (b) a thematic issue (Education; Free Expression; Disappearance; etc.); the European Human Rights Framework (primarily Court); the Inter-American Human Rights Framework (including Commission and Court); the Organization of American States Special Rapporteurs by theme; and other emerging regional (Middle East and Asia) or sub-regional (i.e. ECOWAS) human rights frameworks. Most of these human rights actors accept the filing of complaints, reports, petitions or other proceedings on human rights violations. Following the reception of complaints and other proceedings, each of these actors can utilize several mechanisms for addressing accountability for human rights violations by state, and some non-state, armed groups. These mechanisms may include investigations, comments, reviews of compliance, establishment of monitoring, and reporting. Legal and human rights actors can submit complaints, reports or other procedures. These actors can also produce advocacy documents or otherwise advocate for others to produce submission to human rights bodies.

Data Needs: As with any response, the data needs include data that can be submitted within a complaint or report as well as data used to trigger investigations:

- Incident data: Quantitative data on attacks and the context of attacks including perpetrators, motives and impacts.
- Qualitative data: Qualitative information from victims, witnesses and responders can provide detailed contextual data on attacks and their impacts.
### Annex 3: Summary of Proposed Monitoring Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Monitoring Element</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Outputs/Uses</th>
<th>Operational/Feasibility Concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Investigations and Studies</td>
<td>• True prevalence or incidence rates of attacks in a given country or sub-region of a country; • In-depth information on the context, motives and/or impact of attacks; • Evaluating the effectiveness of specific responses to attacks; and • Documenting best identification-response practices.</td>
<td>• Prevalence/Monitoring Effectiveness Study: • Community Response/Best Practices Case Study • Trial/Evaluation of Response Effectiveness</td>
<td>• Provides prevalence/incidence rates for multiple uses • Enhances future responses by identifying best practices • Allows for greater prevention by unpacking motivation and impact information</td>
<td>• Could be carried out under the oversight of information officer in cluster (see below) • Would require research team to be on the ground collecting data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Full-time network information officers in education or protection clusters | • Compile data specifically on attacks on education that comes in through cluster • Ensures attacks are identified, information disseminated and responses are triggered | • Track information collection using agency reports, security data, OCHA sit-reps and other country-based information flows • Seek to promote and coordinate response initiatives aimed at political, legal, and or humanitarian change. • Lobby country donors to ensure such placements take place | • In-depth, timely and continuous incident data useful for country-based responses • Input into a format similar to the draft Education Under Attack Report Card sent to a regional/global body who would synthesize this country level information and disseminate | • In countries where the cluster is decentralized, it may be difficult to obtain information of consistent quantity and quality across provinces/regions. There may need to be more than one monitor in these cases. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Monitoring Element</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Outputs/Uses</th>
<th>Operational/Feasibility Concerns</th>
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</table>
| **Local reporters to trigger enhanced monitoring** | • Build in to the system reporting thresholds which, if satisfied, would trigger more enhanced monitoring activities.  
• Would create additional incentives for local reporters to provide information by guaranteeing an on the ground response.  
• Increase local reporting and thereby enhance the ability of a global monitoring system to gather timely information about attacks. | • Triggers would consist of pre-disclosed reporting thresholds which if met would activate heightened response activity on the part of the global monitoring system or one of its components.  
• The trigger system could consist of resources and response capacity available “on call” for deployment if the trigger threshold is met. | • Increased local reporting and investment in monitoring.  
• Specific outputs of “triggered” responses, such as case or country reports | • Granting local actors a voice in the allocation of any such response resources within the global system  
• Challenges may include significant difficulty in identifying suitably attractive “triggered” responses that are also feasible within the financial, institutional or political constraints of any global monitoring system.  
• Additional consultation and research into local actors’ needs, desired responses and concerns about reporting may be advised |
| **Pre-identify specific response vectors for greater local response/impact** | • Advance identification and targeting of specific, desired response vectors may be a way of increasing both local reporting and the likelihood of meaningful local response.  
• Carefully monitor specific types of attack data necessary to trigger a specific response, and then deliver that data through a pre-determined stakeholder-monitor to the target respondent capable of delivering the desired response | • Whatever type of data the stakeholder-monitor would need to prod the target-respondent to act.  
• Would facilitate more timely use of data by pre-determining use.  
• Response would begin when a specified attack occurred and a local reporter provides the necessary data | • Increased local reporting  
• Better coordination and use of information collected  
• Increased local responses | • Increase incentives for local reporting and maximize use of collected information to trigger effective, on the ground responses.  
• Challenges may include significant difficulty in identifying suitably attractive responses that are also feasible within the financial, institutional or political capabilities of target respondent  
• Additional consultation and research may be needed with global advocates, key target-respondents, and local actors. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Monitoring Element</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Outputs/Uses</th>
<th>Operational/Feasibility Concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Annual Report</td>
<td>• Provide baseline evidence of attacks on education at the country level.&lt;br&gt;• The UNESCO <em>Education Under Attack</em> report, was cited as one of the most effective reports for advocacy purposes and as the primary global advocacy source and tool for protecting education from attack.&lt;br&gt;• The data collected would be global in nature, based on incidents and be produced annually.</td>
<td>• Almost exclusive use of Secondary Data Collection methods.&lt;br&gt;• Requires frequent and consistent communication with in-country field agents working with UNICEF, the Education Cluster, UNESCO field offices and relevant NGOs.&lt;br&gt;• Country-based monitors would need to be identified through a snowball methodology aimed at producing a network of contacts.&lt;br&gt;• Additional desk research required&lt;br&gt;• Systematic and continuous media searches</td>
<td>• Country-level incident data including counts of various attacks and where available context information, motive, perpetrator and impact data.&lt;br&gt;• Incident data would provide a kind of baseline estimate of incidents.&lt;br&gt;• Compile the country level legal and political data cited by stakeholders as needed data for advocacy.&lt;br&gt;• Most useful for advocacy-level responses.</td>
<td>• Financially and logistically feasible as would not require travel and could be collated with one full-time staff member.&lt;br&gt;• Important information to collect annually in order to maintain a spotlight on the issue and document trends over time.&lt;br&gt;• Likely that the number of incidents collected in the report will increase with the amount of resources available for the project.</td>
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<p>| Data Sharing/Website Development | • An information hub for protecting education from attack. The portal for the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack and/or a Global Investigative Network&lt;br&gt;• Regularly updated with news related to attacks on education. | • The website would be appropriate for public visitors with open access, and could also have a restricted section for experts and field programmers.&lt;br&gt;• Monitors at the country level would have to feed information to the site administrator who would have to compile and upload it. | • A concise means to store and provide information related to attacks on education |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Potential Monitoring Element</th>
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<th>Outputs/Uses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish Priority Attacks, Indicators and Baselines for Attacks (All levels)</td>
<td>• Greater standardization of data collection methodologies and templates, • Focus on specific responses deemed most likely to serve the objectives and could be expanded to include a wider range of attacks. • Distinct prioritization schemes may be warranted for primary/secondary education versus higher education</td>
<td>• Would narrow the scope of attacks to the most violent, widespread and/or egregious types for initial monitoring. • Would require developing standardized definitions, indicators of specific attacks, verification criteria and formats for reporting (input and output) of data.</td>
<td>• Standard definitions, indicators and baselines of a defined sub-set of priority attacks. • If paired with standardized data-coding recommendations, may also encourage greater sharing of data already collected</td>
<td>• A relatively low-cost way to narrow the scope of monitoring attacks to manageable levels. Could begin with the drafting of a proposed prioritization system report, followed by a period of consultation and comment, repeated as necessary. • Challenges may include obtaining sufficient consensus on initial attacks to include, identifying suitable indicators and establishing baselines for certain types of attacks which do not easily lend themselves to baseline comparisons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exploratory Database Study</td>
<td>• Several organizations have database projects that may contain information on attacks on education or on general attacks or violence. It would be useful to support a research project to identify relevant databases and explore operational linkages.</td>
<td>• Desk research and interviews with developers of the databases; • Analysis of the actual databases and their components and/or a review workshop.</td>
<td>• Limited to the willingness of organizational contacts to share information, and access to data may be limited due to confidentiality and security concerns. • May require considerable time and political agreement—and may never reach a level of cooperation to make such an effort worthwhile.</td>
<td>• Identify a set of actors amenable to sharing information and/or linking database efforts, thereby enhancing routine data collection efforts over the long term. • Opportunities to extract education-specific attack data or to engage organizations to include database variables that would clearly indicate attacks on education. • Lessons about how the databases came into being, what the challenges and key considerations were, steps taken for buy-in, training, and data flows which could contribute to the thinking with respect to developing an education database. • A shared set of indicators could be developed to enhance consistency and quality of data collection efforts.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Where do the attacks or threats occur (e.g. in school, or as students travel to and from school)?
Who are the perpetrators?
What is known about the motivations for the attacks?
How are males/females targeted differently?
Do military forces or armed groups have access to schools for the purpose of military recruitment or indoctrination?
If so, what is the nature and frequency of their presence in schools?
Do military forces or armed groups pressure or force teachers to include particular material as part of their lesson plans?
Is there evidence that recruitment or political indoctrination in the schools has suppressed school attendance or contributed to drop-out?
Is curriculum used to isolate or discriminate against minority groups?
Which coordination mechanisms are functioning at the national level? At the district/regional level?
Which government actors and organizations provide support to education?
Which organizations/actors collect data on attacks against schools? How is this data recorded? (frequency, type of database, etc.)

**EDUCATION COORDINATION MECHANISMS**

- Who is occupying schools?
- Incidence of occupation?
- # schools no longer functioning due to occupation
- # schools partially functioning/at partial capacity due to occupation
- Consequences for pupils and education personnel when share premises with soldiers?
- Length of time of occupation?
- Justification for occupation?
- # students no longer in school because of occupations
- # students diverted to other schools or temporary schools as a result of occupation
- What is known about the purpose of the occupation?
Annex 5: Country Selection Issues

Exemplar Country Considerations
Contributed by: Courtney Erwin, Legal Accountability Program Manager, Education Above All (EAA)

Palestine
Piloting a GIN in Palestine would elicit information related to a fairly well developed system. The affected area is small, which allows for ease of access and encourages multi-stakeholder engagement. Palestine has functioning institutions (education and governance) and a robust civil society, comprised of local and international human rights, humanitarian, and education NGOs. These agencies are working together in a number of ways, including in the context of ‘attacks on education.’ Different stakeholders (UN, local NGOs, INGOs, governmental ministries, local media, international media) are monitoring, documenting, and reporting on attacks and then responding to them both collaboratively and independently in a variety of ways (e.g., as an unofficial MRM, to improve school safety, for human rights litigation, etc.). Piloting the GMS in Palestine could offer insights about best practices as well as how to mature and advance the current systems and mechanisms with respect to better monitoring and reporting attacks against education and responding to them more effectively.

DRC
Piloting the GMS in the DRC would elicit different information from that of Palestine; namely, it would highlight the challenges of implementing such a system in a vastly larger physical area, and one that is more remote and inaccessible. The DRC’s lack of or weak institutions and less robust civil society could offer valuable insights into how to approach such a context for the purposes of monitoring and reporting and then responses. With respect to legal responses, the DRC could provide some interesting lessons; over the past year, the UN has led special investigations into gross human rights and humanitarian law violations committed during its civil conflict which have resulted in the proposed creation of dedicated processes, such as hybrid courts to adjudicate alleged crimes and a fund for reparations for the victims; the International Criminal Court has opened investigations and cases; and international NGOs have partnered with local NGOs and governmental institutions to conduct legal trainings and then support local judicial processes (prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity). While much of these legal responses are directed to general rule of law development, and also focus on sexual violence, they could provide insights into their monitoring, documenting, and reporting processes; the collaborations between many stakeholders; and, how they used data to successfully trigger responses.

1 OHCHR’s DRC Mapping Report (http://www.ohchr.org/en/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/RDCProjetMapping.aspx) and the OHCHR’s Report of the Panel on Remedies and Reparations (http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_Reparations_Report_en.pdf). Note that both reports, while very focused on sexual violence, do mention education (the Mapping Report identifies violations committed against schools, teachers, and students and the Report on Reparations cites education as a priority concern: “The panel sought to elicit from victims a sense of what their most pressing needs are and what might help restore their dignity and give them some sense of justice beyond prosecution. Further to the paramount need for peace, almost all of the victims identified medical care and education for their children and in some cases for themselves, as their greatest needs. Education was seen by mothers as the key to their children’s future and self-reliance. In thinking about compensation for victims, one woman suggested that the number of schools be multiplied for the great number of orphans, to help rescue their lives, suggesting that one of them might grow up to be President of the country if they could only go to school…”


3 Recently, a partnership between the American Bar Association (ABA) and the Open Society Institute (OSI) and local NGOs and government has resulted in the creation of mobile clinics, which go to remote parts of the DRC and adjudicate war crimes and crimes against humanity cases related to sexual violence: http://apps.americanbar.org/col/africa/democratic_republic_congo.html and http://blog.soros.org/2011/02/fizi-diary-reversing-the-stigma-of-sex-crimes/.
Annex 6. List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABA</td>
<td>American Bar Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARA</td>
<td>Council for Assisting Refugee Academics</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEART</td>
<td>Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations Concerning Teaching Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Child Protection in Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUPFMH</td>
<td>Columbia University Program on Forced Migration &amp; Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EAA</td>
<td>Education Above All</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education For All</td>
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<td>EI</td>
<td>Education International</td>
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<td>EUA</td>
<td>Education Under Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOA</td>
<td>Field Operating Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFA-FTI</td>
<td>Education For All Fast Track Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPEA</td>
<td>Global Coalition to Protecting Education From Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHEC</td>
<td>Global Higher Education Consolidator</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIN</td>
<td>Global Investigative Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMR</td>
<td>Global Monitoring Report</td>
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<td>GMS</td>
<td>Global Monitoring System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIE</td>
<td>Institute of International Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRM</td>
<td>Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>NEAR</td>
<td>Network for Education and Academic Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NYU</td>
<td>New York University</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
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<td>OSRG-</td>
<td>Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAC</td>
<td>Children Affected By Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>PPCC</td>
<td>Partnerships for Protecting Children in Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHEM</td>
<td>Regional Higher Education Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Scholars at Risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Short Message Service</td>
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<td>SR</td>
<td>Special Rapporteur</td>
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<td>SRF</td>
<td>Scholar Rescue Fund</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Safety and Security</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organizations</td>
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</table>
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